此次清洗发生于2026-01-26，被描述为四个因素的汇合：欺诈、不信任、阻挠与生存。张又侠是政治局中除习近平外唯一的“太子党”，其父辈渊源与长期私人关系使其长期被视为不可触碰。然而，仅以腐败为由清除如此高位将领，标志着中共军内庇护体系的断裂。事件被界定为非常规清洗，其根源在于军事准备失败与最高领导人安全焦虑的叠加，而非单一纪律问题。
首要因素是军事能力的系统性失真。围绕台海的统一目标高度现实，但张主导多年的装备体系被揭示为空心化。火箭军暴露出导弹燃料注水、发射井无法开启等硬件失效，显示并非个案而是长期结构性问题。此前国防部长李尚福落马进一步指向反情报漏洞与外部渗透风险，使习近平将现状类比为俄军在乌克兰的受挫。结论是：继续保留张等于默认台海战略被腐败与无能冻结。
第二与第三因素涉及派系结构与“黑材料”。张代表军内既得利益的老派网络，其盘根错节的庇护关系被视为重建的主要阻力；在何卫东、苗华体系被清除后，留下单一派系将加剧失衡。激烈内斗还促使对手集中抛出张的腐败证据，使其政治免疫失效。最终的生存逻辑是先发制人：鉴于1971年林彪事件的历史记忆，以及为确保2027年二十一大连任第四任期，习近平选择在风险累积前清除潜在不稳定变量，以震慑军队并压缩反抗空间。
The purge dated 2026-01-26 is framed as a convergence of four drivers: fraud, distrust, obstruction, and survival. Zhang Youxia was the only “princeling” in the Politburo besides Xi Jinping, with family ties and personal loyalty long regarded as ironclad. Removing such a figure on corruption grounds signals a rupture in the PLA’s patronage calculus. This was not a routine disciplinary case but an extraordinary act rooted in the overlap of failed military preparation and the supreme leader’s security anxiety.
The first driver is systemic military falsification. The objective of unification with Taiwan remained concrete, but the equipment system Zhang oversaw was exposed as hollow. Rocket Force scandals—water-filled missile fuel tanks and inoperable silo lids—indicated structural failures, not isolated defects. The earlier fall of Defense Minister Li Shangfu pointed to counterintelligence weaknesses and possible external penetration, prompting comparisons to Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine. The assessment was stark: retaining Zhang meant accepting that the Taiwan strategy was immobilized by corruption and incompetence.
The second and third drivers concern factional power and incriminating evidence. Zhang embodied an entrenched old-guard network whose patronage impeded overhaul; with the He Weidong–Miao Hua bloc already eliminated, leaving one dominant faction risked imbalance. Intense infighting generated extensive “black material,” stripping Zhang of political immunity. The final logic was preemption: mindful of the 1971 Lin Biao incident and seeking a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027, Xi moved before risk compounded, aiming to intimidate the officer corps and eliminate a potentially destabilizing variable.