虽然在 2026 年 4 月 30 日新任 Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei 的声明中，伊朗再次宣称在核计划、导弹计划、霍尔木兹海峡通往国际航道及美军在中东持续存在上都不会让步，但文章认为这更像是 hubristic 的姿态，而非优势。2026 年 4 月 8 日的停火背景下，美国凭海军护航仅以有限代价开放了少量船只通过海峡，伊朗随即用飞弹与无人机攻击阿拉伯联合酋长国，包括油站设施与多艘未受保护商船，促使美军击沉了六艘小船，并驳斥了伊朗国家媒体称美军护航舰曾中弹的说法。这次行动显示通航理论上可行，但代价高且伴随重大风险。

文章引用 1622 年 Anglo-Persian 占领霍尔木兹岛要塞的历史事件，说明 Khamenei 试图以波斯历史与民族叙事为伊斯兰共和国包装正当性；然而伊朗里亚尔再次下跌、1 月群众抗议、IRGC 高层伤亡与防空资产受创，皆显示其权力基础仍脆弱。若要真正扭转经济与推动大规模改革，现政体几乎必须走向事实上的体制转型。政权内部也出现分歧：总统 Masoud Pezeshkian、外长 Abbas Araghchi、议长 Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf 偏向谈判停战，但在安全体系未出现系统性倒戈前，这种分歧尚未构成可实现政变的力量。

White House 也出现相似判断失误：Donald Trump 将战争描述为已获胜、认为伊朗军队被摧毁、经济崩溃、核设施与油基础设施即将‘即将崩解’。而 Ghalibaf 在 X 上算式化的观点虽认为伊朗可凭限制波斯湾供应抬高全球能源价格，并认定美方选项已被耗尽，但其前提并不完整。文章认为，当 4 月 8 日停火尚在且霍尔木兹仍受阻时，冲突核心是耐力赛：双方都无法承受无限期的经济与政治压力，因此会轮流尝试打破僵局。任何美方开启海峡的尝试都可能引发对美舰艇或海湾能源设施的反击，并反向推高能源市场。两边因 hubris 而高估自己可控制结果，让下一次误判几乎仅差一步就可能把局势再推向战争。

Despite Iran’s April 30 statement by newly installed Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, which rejected concessions on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, Strait of Hormuz access, and a continued US presence in the Middle East, the article argues this was hubristic posturing rather than real leverage. In the April 8 ceasefire context, the US Navy escort operation reopened only a small flow of ships through the Strait of Hormuz at high risk and cost; Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on the United Arab Emirates, including an oil terminal and unprotected commercial vessels. The US then sank six small boats, and denied claims that an escort vessel had been hit. The move showed Hormuz can be reopened, but not safely or cheaply.

The piece links Khamenei’s framing to the 1622 Anglo-Persian capture of a fortress on Hormuz Island, arguing he is wrapping regime legitimacy in Persian nationalism because domestic legitimacy is weak: the rial is collapsing again, mass protests followed last January, and the Revolutionary Guards lost senior commanders while air defenses were heavily degraded. The article argues a true reset would likely require de facto regime change, not merely rhetorical hardline. Reform-minded figures—President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf—favor ending the war, and their divide with harder-line voices is visible, but not yet sufficient for a regime collapse unless parts of security institutions defect.

The White House also miscalculates. Donald Trump’s claims that the war is already won and Iran’s military economy destroyed resemble overreach, while Ghalibaf’s X-published equation emphasized Iran’s ability to raise global energy prices by constricting Gulf supply and treated U.S. options as mostly spent; the article says this is flawed. With the April 8 ceasefire in place and Hormuz still constrained, the conflict is a test of endurance: neither side can sustain unlimited economic and political pain. Any US push to force shipping freedom risks reciprocal blows against US vessels or Gulf energy infrastructure, potentially removing significant oil and gas from world markets. Hubris on both sides is eroding realistic risk assessment, making war resumption only one step away.