俄罗斯业务愈发像是一个能产生现金、但受制裁束缚的公用事业，而非正常银行：它几乎已停止发放新贷款；曾经利润丰厚的跨境支付业务也因制裁合规成本使小额转帐变得不划算，而缩窄到少数大型企业客户。它对储蓄帐户支付 0 利息以抑制资金流入，但客户仍在那里持有超过 €10 billion（约 $11.6 billion）；在放贷基本冻结的情况下，它把资金以两位数利率存放在俄罗斯央行，帮助形成一笔「不可触碰」的现金堆，已增至约 €5 billion。Strobl 以明确的时间尺度凸显营运萎缩风险，提出疑问：一家 3 years 都未发放新贷款的银行，是否仍保有放贷技能。就连缩减业务也出现执行问题：直到 01/2026，应用程式似乎仍提供房贷与消费信贷；Strobl 将此归因于过时的行动平台，并表示该选项此后已移除，且「最近任何时候」都没有处理贷款。
退出机制与地缘政治让锁定效应更严重：依俄罗斯规定，该子公司出售价格不得高于估计公允价值的 40%，且任何出售还将面临 35% 的退出税；Strobl 表示，至少需要 5 方批准（奥地利、俄罗斯、美国与欧洲的监管机构，加上 Vladimir Putin）。Strobl 现年 66，已与约十几位潜在买家接触，甚至在 2024 前往莫斯科，但他将于 07/01/2026 卸任；其继任者 Michael Hollerer 预计不会在实质上改变做法。与此同时，整个集团在 23 个国家共有 34,000 名员工，并在波兰承受另一项已量化的压力：外币放贷诉讼已经抹去超过 €1 billion，未来仍可能产生更多成本。更长期的统计显示，走向正常化的诱因在减弱：自 2021 以来，EU-俄罗斯贸易已萎缩超过 70%，而欧盟计划在 2027 前完成逐步淘汰俄罗斯石油与天然气进口，意味著即使出现战后和解，俄罗斯的盈利也可能仍被困住并带来政治代价。
Raiffeisen Bank International AG (Austria) has spent about 4 years trying to solve a wartime paradox: it still owns the largest foreign bank in Russia, the unit is “immensely profitable” by some measures, but it cannot (or will not) get the cash out of Russia or complete an exit, even though rivals such as Societe Generale and HSBC have left. After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 02/2022, CEO Johann Strobl suspended lending in Russia and worked on contingency plans against asset seizure, while also managing the group’s exposure in Ukraine, where it operates the country’s largest foreign lender and has taken measures like evacuations, shutdowns in threatened areas, and emergency service points during air raids. The group’s long regional footprint is framed with dates and cycles of upheaval: entry into Russia in 1996, post-Berlin Wall expansion after 1989, and the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.
The Russia operation increasingly resembles a cash-generating, sanctions-constrained utility rather than a normal bank: it has all but stopped making new loans, and the once-lucrative foreign-payments business has narrowed to a few large corporate clients because sanctions-compliance costs make smaller transfers uneconomical. It pays 0 interest on savings accounts to deter inflows, yet customers still hold more than €10 billion (about $11.6 billion) there; with lending largely frozen, it places funds at Russia’s central bank at double-digit rates, helping build an “untouchable” cash pile that has grown to about €5 billion. Strobl highlights the operational atrophy risk with a concrete time horizon, asking whether a bank that has not granted a new loan for 3 years still retains lending skill. Even the wind-down has had execution issues: as recently as 01/2026 the app still appeared to offer mortgages and consumer credit, which Strobl attributed to an outdated mobile platform and said the option has since been removed, with no loans processed “anytime recently.”
Exit mechanics and geopolitics compound the lock-in: under Russian rules the unit cannot be sold for more than 40% of estimated fair value and any sale would face a 35% exit tax, while Strobl says approval would be needed from at least 5 parties (regulators in Austria, Russia, the US, and Europe, plus Vladimir Putin). Strobl, 66, will step down on 07/01/2026 after engaging with roughly a dozen potential buyers and even traveling to Moscow in 2024, but his successor Michael Hollerer is not expected to change the approach materially. Meanwhile the broader group runs 34,000 employees across 23 countries and faces separate quantified pressure in Poland, where foreign-currency lending lawsuits have already wiped out more than €1 billion with further costs possible. The longer-run statistics point to reduced normalization incentives: EU-Russia trade has contracted more than 70% since 2021, and the European Union plans to complete a phase-out of Russian oil and gas imports by 2027, suggesting the profitability in Russia may remain trapped and politically costly even if a postwar settlement emerges.