中国自11月7日起对日本施加持续压力，源于首相高市早苗就台湾突发事态的表态。高市在就任约两周半后表示，中国若攻击台湾将对日本构成生存性威胁，日本可行使集体自卫权。北京强烈反对，称其为干涉内政，并自一周后开始反制，包括劝阻中国公民赴日、要求航司减少航班、延缓解除自2023年8月起实施的日本水产品进口禁令。中宣部主导舆论攻势，央视《新闻联播》自11月13日起几乎每日播出批评内容，至1月3日恢复。1月6日，商务部宣布收紧对日两用物项出口管制，1月8日称民用不受影响，但随后民用稀土许可被拖延或拒绝。

北京的判断建立在高市政府在国会两院均无多数的前提上，认为其立场脆弱。然而压力并未改变对台立场，反而推高支持率。高市内阁自10月21日成立后保持强劲支持，12月19—21日的民调显示支持率达75%。中国掌握约70%的稀土产量，收紧被称为“工业维生素”的出口，凸显其不满，但政治效果适得其反。

在高支持率加持下，高市转而考虑国内政治。她已表示拟于本月底解散众议院，若实施，大选可能在2月8日或2月15日举行。执政党与盟友在众院仅有微弱多数，此举被寄望于恢复席位、巩固权力。临近选举限制了修复对华关系的空间；尽管企业担忧双边经贸冲击，稀土问题不太可能主导竞选。结果是，中国的高压策略反而促成提前选举并巩固了高市的政治地位。

China has applied sustained pressure on Japan since Nov. 7 after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi commented on a possible Taiwan contingency. About two and a half weeks into office, she said a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose an existential threat to Japan, enabling collective self-defense. Beijing denounced the remarks as interference and began retaliation a week later: urging nationals to avoid Japan, cutting flights, and delaying the lifting of an import ban on Japanese seafood imposed in August 2023. A propaganda campaign followed, with CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo airing near-daily criticism from Nov. 13, resuming on Jan. 3 after a brief pause. On Jan. 6, the commerce ministry tightened export controls on dual-use items to Japan; on Jan. 8 it claimed civilian trade would be unaffected, yet civilian rare-earth licenses were later delayed or denied.

Beijing assumed Takaichi’s government was weak because it lacks majorities in both Diet houses. The pressure failed to shift Japan’s Taiwan stance and instead boosted approval. Since taking office on Oct. 21, Takaichi’s cabinet has enjoyed strong support; a Dec. 19–21 poll showed 75% approval. China controls about 70% of global rare-earth production, and restricting these “industrial vitamins” signaled irritation but produced counterproductive political effects.

Buoyed by high approval, Takaichi pivoted to domestic politics. She has indicated plans to dissolve the lower house by month’s end, with a general election likely on Feb. 8 or Feb. 15. The ruling party and its partner hold only a razor-thin lower-house majority, and an early vote is expected to recover seats and strengthen power. Campaign timing limits room to repair ties with Beijing; despite corporate concern over trade and rare earths, the issue is unlikely to dominate. The outcome is that China’s pressure hastened a snap election and reinforced Takaichi’s position.