他以20世纪30年代为基准。大萧条与债务紧缩引发严重的国内阶级冲突，促使德国、日本等国走向民粹主义和威权主义。关键数据是：德国1929年失业率约25%，到1938年在大规模财政/军事扩张后接近于0；人均收入上升22%，1934—1938年的实际增长率超过8%；战争爆发前德国股市涨幅约70%。日本在1929—1931年间出口下降约50%，并放弃金本位并贬值货币；美国1941年的石油禁运使日本贸易约下降75%、石油约下降80%，进一步推高了接近战争的压力。
当前局势与这一逻辑相呼应。资本战争手段包括资产冻结或没收、排除出资本市场，以及出口/进口或能源封锁。在国家为战争融资而发行债务并扩张货币时，资本管制、征税与没收风险上升，使大多数债务资产走弱。黄金（有时为白银或实物清算）因此更具可信度，因为战争中信贷常被视为不可靠。市场估值往往跟随预期战场结果：德国和日本早期收益后来被抹去，而美国的融资与动员最终强化了其表现。他还指出外部秩序存在约150年周期波动，强国通常能维持约200–300年，但任何霸权都非永久；政策智慧在于避免“愚蠢战争”，保留生产力，并在升级不可逆前追求可协商的双赢结果。
In his February 14, 2026 Munich essay “Deconstructing,” Ray Dalio says the post-1945 order has ended. Leaders like Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron and Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference echoed that old rules no longer hold and power, not law, now structures interstate relations. He frames a sixth-cycle phase of disorder: trade/economic, technology, geopolitical, capital, and military conflict. The first four can deepen for years before violence. Great powers locked in mistrust face prisoner’s-dilemma escalation, so war risk rises when power is roughly balanced and interests are existential.
He uses the 1930s as benchmark. The Great Depression and debt deflation created severe domestic class conflict, enabling populist and authoritarian shifts in Germany, Japan and others. Quantitatively: Germany unemployment near 25% in 1929 fell to near zero by 1938 after large fiscal/military expansion; per-capita income rose 22%, and real annual growth exceeded 8% in 1934–1938; German equities rose about 70% before war. Japan’s exports fell by roughly 50% (1929–1931), it left the gold standard and devalued its currency, and U.S. oil blockades in 1941 cut Japan’s trade by about 75% and oil by 80%, creating near-war pressure.
Current conditions mirror that pattern. Capital-war tools are asset freeze/confiscation, exclusion from capital markets, and export/import or energy blockades. As states fund conflict through debt issuance and monetary expansion, capital controls, taxation, and seizure risk rise, weakening most debt assets. Gold (or sometimes silver/physical settlement) becomes more credible because wartime credit is distrusted. Market valuation tends to follow expected battlefield outcomes: early gains in Germany/Japan were later wiped out, while U.S. financing and mobilization eventually strengthened American performance. He also notes recurring 150-year external-order waves and durable powers lasting 200–300 years, but no hegemony is permanent; policy wisdom is to avoid “stupid wars,” preserve productivity and seek negotiated win–win outcomes before escalation becomes irreversible.