伊朗近 9,000 万人已在全面网际网路断网下生活超过 6 天；在 2026 年 2 月 28 日美国与以色列飞弹袭击之后，对外流量几乎立刻崩跌。Kentik 的 Doug Madory 表示，各网路的出境流量下降约 99%，仅剩极少量白名单连线。这次断网延续了 1 月初的全面断网，也显示 2019、2022、2025 与 2026 年两次封锁之后，伊朗国家对数位压制的技术已更成熟。

即使这 1% 左右的残余连线也不稳定。Doug Madory 与 Georgia Tech 的 IODA 都指出，空袭可能已额外破坏关键网际网路或电力基础设施，因此即使政府解除封锁，连线问题仍可能持续。与此同时，National Information Network（NIN）仍支撑国内应用程式与日常活动，但它也强化分层式存取、监控与宣传。Factnameh 分析战争最初 72 小时内、50 个在封锁期间仍活跃的 Telegram 频道共 50,000 则贴文，发现其活动未中断，甚至比先前更活跃。

一般民众可用的绕过工具正迅速缩小。Psiphon 的 Conduit 在 2026 年 2 月初于伊朗境外约有 375,000 个「Conduit Stations」；1 月底单日高峰曾有超过 900 万名伊朗人使用 Psiphon 网路。Psiphon 在 1 月于伊朗境内有近 1,900 万名不重复使用者，2 月超过 2,100 万名，但本周在全面断网下仅剩每日约 60,000 至 100,000 名使用者。Ali Tehrani 将现况概括为约 1% 的连通性而非归零，突显伊朗外部网际网路未来比以往更不确定。

Nearly 90 million Iranians have lived under a total internet blackout for more than six days, and outbound traffic collapsed almost immediately after US and Israeli missile strikes on February 28, 2026. Kentik’s Doug Madory says traffic leaving all networks fell by about 99 percent, leaving only a tiny amount of whitelisted connectivity. The shutdown follows another total blackout in early January and shows how Iran’s digital repression has become more technically sophisticated after shutdowns in 2019, 2022, 2025, and twice in 2026.

Even that roughly 1 percent residual connectivity is unstable. Doug Madory and Georgia Tech’s IODA both indicate that air strikes likely caused additional damage to critical internet or power infrastructure, so problems could persist even if the government lifted the shutdown. Meanwhile, the National Information Network (NIN) continues to support domestic apps and daily activity, but it also deepens tiered access, surveillance, and propaganda. Factnameh analyzed 50,000 Telegram posts from 50 channels that stayed active during the first 72 hours of the war and found no interruption in activity; instead, the channels became more active than before.

Workarounds available to ordinary people are shrinking quickly. Psiphon’s Conduit had about 375,000 Conduit Stations running outside Iran at the beginning of February 2026; on a peak day at the end of January, more than 9 million Iranians used the Psiphon network. Psiphon recorded nearly 19 million unique users inside Iran in January and more than 21 million in February, but during this week’s full shutdown only about 60,000 to 100,000 users per day remained. Ali Tehrani summarized the situation as about 1 percent connectivity rather than zero, underscoring that Iran’s external internet future is more uncertain than ever.