从 2013 到 2019 年，尽管 Jeffrey Epstein 先前有刑事定罪且内部合规疑虑一再出现，在 JPMorgan 与他切割之后，Deutsche Bank 仍保留并扩大了与他的业务关系。透过美国司法部披露释出的内部邮件显示，该行将他视为具有战略价值的超高净值客户，高阶经理加速其开户流程，并豁免了高风险客户通常要面对的更深入声誉审查步骤。这段关系始于 2013 年 10 月约 $180 million 的资金流入，之后扩大到数十个帐户合计约 $225 million，而银行人员将他描述为接触其他富有潜在客户的入口，包括 Leon Black 和 Lawrence Summers。

文件显示，反洗钱与风险警示反复出现，却一再被推翻或以有利于 Epstein 的方式结案：包括付给俄罗斯与东欧女性的款项、用途不明的信托架构、可疑的现金模式，以及复杂的关联方转帐，例如一笔与 Black 关联实体及 Epstein 关联航空实体有关的 $22.5 million 付款。Deutsche 后来告诉检方，它处理了约 $875,000 给名义上的外国模特儿，其中包括经由海外公司的转帐，以及一笔付给 Jean-Luc Brunel 经纪公司的 $80,000 款项。即使已出现可疑活动报告和对规避门槛支票兑现的疑虑，该行仍把 Epstein 的借记提款上限从 $1,000 提高到 $12,000，而监管机构后来表示他平均每年提领约 $200,000 现金。

虽然 Deutsche 在 2018 年 12 月 21 日通知 Epstein 将终止关系并设定 2 月 29 日期限，但转帐与帐户活动仍持续到 2019 年 4 月，其中包括要求交付 €50,000 现金与提供相当于 €7,500 的支援，而且多个帐户一直到他在 2019 年 7 月 6 日被捕前仍维持开启；到 7 月 8 日，员工仍在标记紧急关户，剩余余额合计 $33.77。文章证据显示这是一种长期将营收置于风险之上的文化：内部备注提到每年超过 $1 million 的营收潜力，而合规团队记录到不断升级的红旗却未被果断处理。财务与监管后果相当重大，Deutsche 因 Epstein 相关罚款与和解支付约 $225 million，另加与更广泛合规失败相关的处罚，并在之后承认开户与控制弱点是重大错误。

From 2013 to 2019, Deutsche Bank kept and expanded Jeffrey Epstein’s business after JPMorgan exited him, despite his prior criminal conviction and repeated internal compliance concerns. Internal emails released through US Department of Justice disclosures show the bank treated him as a strategically valuable ultra-high-net-worth client, with senior managers accelerating onboarding and waiving deeper reputational review steps that high-risk clients would typically face. The relationship started with roughly $180 million arriving in October 2013 and later grew to about $225 million across dozens of accounts, while bankers framed him as a gateway to other wealthy prospects including Leon Black and Lawrence Summers.

Documents show recurring anti-money-laundering and risk alerts were repeatedly overridden or resolved in Epstein’s favor: payments to women in Russia and eastern Europe, trust structures with unclear purpose, suspicious cash patterns, and complex related-party transfers such as a $22.5 million payment tied to Black-linked entities and Epstein-linked aviation entities. Deutsche later told prosecutors it processed about $875,000 to ostensible foreign models, including transfers via overseas companies and an $80,000 payment to Jean-Luc Brunel’s agency. Even after suspicious activity reports and concerns about threshold-avoiding check cashing, the bank raised Epstein’s debit withdrawal limit from $1,000 to $12,000, and regulators later said he withdrew about $200,000 in cash per year on average.

Although Deutsche informed Epstein on December 21, 2018 that the relationship would end and set a February 29 deadline, transfers and account activity continued into April 2019, including requests for €50,000 cash delivery and €7,500 equivalent support, and multiple accounts remained open until his July 6, 2019 arrest; on July 8, staff still flagged urgent closures, with remaining balances totaling $33.77. The article’s evidence suggests a sustained revenue-over-risk culture: internal notes cited more than $1 million annual revenue potential, while compliance teams documented escalating red flags that were not acted on decisively. Financial and regulatory consequences were substantial, with Deutsche paying about $225 million in Epstein-related fines and settlements plus penalties tied to broader compliance failures, and later acknowledging onboarding and control weaknesses as major errors.