这类策略常见于「liability management exercises」（LMEs），使赞助方能在法庭外重塑资本结构、降低公开审视与诉讼成本，并借由先取得多数支持来改写清偿顺位。Bloomberg 数据显示，2024 年全球 LME 接近 50 起（约 50 起）；在 Vibrantz 交易中，该公司以多数团体、少数团体与个别贷方三路并行，于正式启动时即取得约 90% 支持，最后几乎获得全体同意；约 10% 未签附带协议者被排除在谈判外并承受最大损失。最大贷方并透过新设子公司提供一笔新的 350 百万美元贷款（约 350 百万美元；约 324 百万欧元），且享有「first-out」超优先顺位；部分既有债务亦被「roll up」进入更高顺位的新贷款，其他个别贷方则可能换得 second-out 或 third-out 位置。
结果往往是长期回收率下降。Fitch Ratings 指出，2016 年至 2025 年上半年期间，先做 LME 后才进入破产的公司，其第一顺位担保债回收率约 39%，明显低于未先做 LME 即进入 Chapter 11 者的约 68%（差距约 29 个百分点；39/68 ≈ 0.57）。Harvard Law School 的 Mark Roe 与 Vasile Rotaru 亦发现，多数被「强制」重整的公司最终仍会申请破产。案例上，First Brands Group 以「roll up」将既有持仓转为超优先破产贷款并以附带协议取得 100% 支持；Saks Global Enterprises 透过 600 百万美元融资（约 600 百万美元；约 555 百万欧元）重排顺位并搭配多层协议；而逾 1 十亿美元（>1 billion）级别的超优先融资（如 Serta Simmons）曾使被排除贷方的债券市值急跌，显示市场回报愈来愈取决于能否快速站队、而非同一类别平等对待。
In today’s credit markets, borrowers increasingly use individual “side deals” and NDAs to push debt restructurings by restricting lenders’ ability to compare terms or challenge a transaction before it closes. At American Securities-backed Vibrantz Technologies, smaller creditors faced a time-pressured choice: sign agreements limiting communication and temporarily waiving litigation to avoid deeper losses, or risk worse outcomes; the largest lenders (GoldenTree Asset Management, Monarch Alternative Capital, Oak Hill Advisors) captured the biggest portions of top-ranking debt.
These tactics often sit inside liability management exercises (LMEs), enabling out-of-court capital-structure reshuffles, less public scrutiny, and lower legal risk by first locking in a slim majority that can rewrite payment priority. Bloomberg data show LMEs reached nearly 50 globally in 2024 (~50). In the Vibrantz overhaul, the company ran three tracks (majority group, minority group, and individual NDAs), launched with about 90% support, and ultimately won approval from almost all lenders; roughly 10% who did not sign side deals were shut out and took the largest losses. A new subsidiary raised a fresh $350 million loan (~$350 million; ~€324 million) with “first-out” super-priority, while some existing debt was “rolled up” into the new senior facility; some individuals could swap into second-out or third-out positions.
Outcomes frequently imply lower long-run recoveries. Fitch Ratings reports that firms undertaking LMEs from 2016 through 1H 2025 before later filing for bankruptcy saw first-lien recoveries of about 39%, versus roughly 68% for firms that entered Chapter 11 without a prior LME (a ~29 percentage-point gap; 39/68 ≈ 0.57). Harvard Law School’s Mark Roe and Vasile Rotaru likewise find most coercively restructured firms end up in bankruptcy anyway. Examples include First Brands Group using “roll ups” and side deals to reach 100% support, Saks Global Enterprises raising $600 million (~$600 million; ~€555 million) while reordering creditor ranks, and >$1 billion super-priority financings (e.g., Serta Simmons) that drove excluded creditors’ debt values sharply lower—highlighting a market where returns hinge on speed and positioning rather than equal treatment within a class.