在西太平洋，China 的核心利益区受益于美国海军资产向 Caribbean 与 Middle East 的再部署，China 在 Taiwan 周边的军事行动自由度上升，并可在更宽松条件下累积资源以应对未来更靠近本土的冲突。Donald Trump 将 Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap 与 Panama Canal 视为「homeland security」要点，但以关税与入侵威胁等冲动手段处理，反而抬升 China 的利益：Beijing 无需在美国本土半球挑战美军，就能以经济牌在美国后院扩张。文章强调，哪怕 Venezuela 的石油产量在假设下回升，也难以追上 China 在 Latin America 既有的国企规模与资源链条，涵盖 oil、gas、lithium、copper 等关键矿产，支撑其在 batteries 与 electric vehicles 的加速优势。
在 Arctic，地理路径限制 China：其通往 Arctic Ocean 的唯一通道在全球另一侧，需绕行 Japan、穿越美国 Aleutian Islands 周边，再经 Bering Strait 进入 Russian Arctic。Beijing 的重点是因极地融冰而出现的新商业航道，尤其是沿 Russia 北岸的 Northern Sea Route，用于更快连接 Russia 的能源与矿产资源并进入 northern Europe 市场。所谓「near-Arctic」身分无法改变其船舶与航空器必须穿越 Japanese 与 US 水域、且受 Russia 制衡的现实；也因此，未见 Chinese naval 或 coastguard 舰艇出现在 Greenland 附近，且迄今仅在靠近 Alaska 的 Bering 和 Chukchi seas 活动。当 Donald Trump 以吞并威胁触动盟友主权底线时，Canada 等中等国家在「最不坏」选项下更可能把 China 当作对冲；同时 Atlantic 与 Caribbean 仍以美国为主，但 China 在其本土区域与全球将获得更自由的操作空间，Pax Americana 因内耗而加速衰退。
US aggression toward adversaries and allies is reshaping global strategic geography. Donald Trump’s erratic pressure on Nato and his “get Greenland” gambit may first benefit Russia, but China is positioned to reap longer-term structural gains, including in the Arctic. By generating repeated shocks in the western hemisphere—from actions involving Venezuela’s leader, to talk of taking a Nato ally’s territory, to threats against Canada—the US increases uncertainty and corrodes the postwar order; in that rupture, Beijing fills the void by default as the relatively stable great power without paying comparable strategic costs.
In the western Pacific, China’s primary interests benefit as key US Navy assets are redeployed to the Caribbean and the Middle East, expanding China’s freedom of action around Taiwan and letting it husband resources for future conflicts nearer home. Trump is right that the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap and the Panama Canal matter for “homeland security,” but pursuing them through tariffs and invasion threats perversely elevates China’s interests: Beijing need not challenge the US militarily in its own hemisphere to expand influence by economic means. The text argues that even a hypothetical revival of Venezuela’s oil output would not match China’s existing state-owned scale across Latin America, spanning oil, gas, lithium, copper, and other critical minerals that underpin accelerating dominance in batteries and electric vehicles.
In the Arctic, geography constrains China: its only route to the Arctic Ocean lies on the far side of the world, past Japan, through US Aleutian Island approaches, and via the Bering Strait into the Russian Arctic. Beijing’s focus is on new commercial sea lanes opened by melting polar ice, especially the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s northern coast, to access Russia’s energy and mineral base and northern Europe’s markets faster. “Near-Arctic” branding does not change the need to traverse Japanese and US waters or the limiting role of Russia; accordingly, no Chinese naval or coastguard vessels have been reported near Greenland, and to date they operate only in the Bering and Chukchi seas near Alaska. As Trump’s seizure threats hit allies’ sovereignty red lines, middle powers such as Canada are pushed toward China as a hedge; the Atlantic and Caribbean remain US-dominant, but China gains a progressively freer hand regionally and globally as Pax Americana erodes.