乌克兰的国有铁路营运商 JSC Ukrainian Railways 已成为对俄战争中的前线资产，每月运送数百万名乘客，同时也承运部队、货物和贸易流量；即使俄罗斯无人机愈来愈锁定行进中的列车，它仍在运作。自2022年2月全面入侵以来，这家公司一直遭到攻击，而3月一班从Lviv开往Dnipro的夜间列车发生的事件，显示当攻击迫使乘客撤离到铁轨上并躲进附近掩蔽处时，他们所面临的危险。同时，由于政府阻止货运费率上调、维修成本变得更高，而且公司背负近$1.1 billion的国际债券，其中超过$700 million必须在7月前偿还或再融资，财务状况已急剧恶化。

1月，Ukrainian Railways停止支付票息，债权人也拒绝了其将债券面值削减20%的请求；4月初开始的谈判一周后破裂，未能达成协议。最大且最具影响力的债权人是VR Capital，这家由Richard Deitz领导的困境债基金也持有Naftogaz的重要部位，并自2000年代以来一直活跃于多项乌克兰重组。Deitz称，他的公司自1998年以来的年化回报约为20%，到2022年时约有20%的资产配置在乌克兰，他主张投资者是依商业条款放款，不应被视为剥削者；而乌克兰官员和经济学家则表示，战时生存应优先于债券持有人回报。这场僵局围绕货运费率展开，该费率自2022年6月以来一直未变；政府因铁路仍是货物与军事物流的关键而抗拒上调，而债券持有人则认为若没有更高收费，公司无法偿付债务。

更广泛的经济背景十分严峻：乌克兰GDP在2022年几乎下跌30%，到年底通膨接近27%，去年铁路基础设施遭到1,195次攻击，而Naftogaz遭受1,399枚投射物打击，且仍需要债务纾困与天然气进口融资。乌克兰公司债，包括Naftogaz、Ukrainian Railways和Metinvest的债券，曾一度失去高达80%的面值，尽管像MHP这样的一些公司在2024年初的2笔交易中成功筹得$550 million。IMF估计，乌克兰未来4年的资金缺口约为$136.5 billion，而联合国预测未来十年的重建成本为$588 billion，这意味著未来能否进入市场，可能取决于当前如何处理这些重组。关键的政策张力在于，投资者想要可信的偿还条款，但乌克兰分析人士认为，为了在战争期间保住公司并最大化日后全额偿还的机会，必须接受大幅减记与延后付款。

Ukraine’s state-owned rail operator, JSC Ukrainian Railways, has become a front-line asset in the war against Russia, moving millions of passengers each month while also carrying troops, cargo, and trade flows even as Russian drones increasingly target moving trains. The company has been under attack since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and a March incident on an overnight Lviv-to-Dnipro train illustrated the danger passengers face when attacks force evacuations onto tracks and into nearby cover. At the same time, the operator’s finances have deteriorated sharply because the government has blocked freight-rate increases, repairs have become more expensive, and the company has struggled under nearly $1.1 billion of international bonds, more than $700 million of which must be repaid or refinanced by July.

In January Ukrainian Railways stopped paying coupons, and creditors rejected its request to write off 20% of bond face value; talks that began in early April ended a week later without a deal. The largest and most influential creditor is VR Capital, the distressed-debt fund led by Richard Deitz, which also holds significant positions in Naftogaz and has been active in multiple Ukrainian restructurings since the 2000s. Deitz, whose firm has produced an annualized return of around 20% since 1998 and had about 20% of assets in Ukraine by 2022, argues that investors lent on commercial terms and should not be treated as exploiters, while Ukrainian officials and economists say wartime survival should outweigh bondholder returns. The standoff centers on freight tariffs, unchanged since June 2022, with the government resisting increases because rail remains vital for goods and military logistics, while bondholders argue the company cannot service debt without higher charges.

The broader economic backdrop is severe: Ukraine’s GDP fell by almost 30% in 2022, inflation reached almost 27% by year-end, and rail infrastructure was attacked 1,195 times last year, while Naftogaz was hit by 1,399 projectiles and continues to need debt relief and gas-import financing. Ukrainian corporate bonds, including those of Naftogaz, Ukrainian Railways, and Metinvest, have at times lost as much as 80% of face value, although some firms such as MHP managed to raise $550 million in 2 deals in early 2024. The IMF estimates Ukraine’s funding gap at about $136.5 billion over the next 4 years, and UN projections put reconstruction costs at $588 billion over the next decade, meaning future market access may depend on how these restructurings are handled now. The key policy tension is that investors want credible repayment terms, but Ukrainian analysts argue that large haircuts and payment delays are necessary to preserve companies during the war and maximize the chance of full repayment later.