在达沃斯，英国前总理马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）提出一个构想：当主要大国越来越具攻击性时，中等强权应协同合作。波斯湾冲突如今成为这一构想最尖锐的检验场景，沙乌地阿拉伯与周边国家面对的是一场它们并未掀起的战争，安全、经济与同盟可信度皆岌岌可危。沙乌地曾支持对伊朗采取武力行动，甚至在2008年赞同切断伊朗核计划的思路，但在愿景2030（Vision 2030）使稳定成为关键、十月七日后以色列扩张加剧，以及唐纳·川普（Donald Trump）将海湾威慑优先顺序让位于以色列利益后，这一立场已明显松动。

沙乌地的困境具有结构性。若华府打击伊朗的能源或海水淡化设施，德黑兰表示将报复海湾基础设施；而沙乌地高度依赖淡水厂，无法承受这类冲击。利雅德也担心，美国若全面打击伊朗，极可能把叶门胡塞武装拖入战局，使其关闭曼德海峡（Bab al-Mandeb）；这将切断通往延布（Yanbu）的1200公里绕道输油管线，停止高达每日至多700万桶的出口（约111万立方米/日），并同时终结2022年的沙乌地—胡塞停火安排。不稳定停火同样不可取：即使签署协议，伊朗仍可能更军事化、更集中，并因事实上掌握霍尔木兹海峡的控制力而拥有更大地缘杠杆。

为了对冲，沙乌地先后与土耳其在2022年展开和解、2025年与巴基斯坦签订军事协议，并与埃及及其他「中等强权」寻求与伊朗调停。然而，这个新兴框架对华府、以色列与德黑兰的实际约束力有限。虽然阿联酋本可成为天然伙伴，却更倾向配合升级以期改变德黑兰政权，对调停支持不足；欧洲亦难以自我装备。面对这一局面，重启战争或接受脆弱协议都会伤害美国盟友；对华府而言，最少伤害的路径，是认真听取沙乌地关切，并以最小附带损害终止这场已将盟国安全与经济作为赌注的战争。

At Davos, Mark Carney proposed an idea: when major powers are becoming more aggressive, middle powers should cooperate. The Gulf conflict now provides the sharpest test of this idea; Saudi Arabia and neighboring states face a war they did not ignite, with security, economy, and alliance credibility all at stake. Saudi Arabia previously supported taking military action against Iran, even endorsing the notion in 2008 of cutting off Iran’s nuclear program, but this position clearly weakened after Vision 2030 made stability essential, Israeli expansion intensified after October 7, and Donald Trump made Gulf deterrence subordinate to Israeli priorities.

Saudi Arabia’s predicament is structural. If Washington attacks Iran’s energy or desalination facilities, Tehran says it will retaliate against Gulf infrastructure, and Saudi Arabia, highly dependent on desalination plants, cannot absorb such shocks. Riyadh also fears that if the United States fully targets Iran, Yemen’s Houthi militia would likely be drawn into the war and may close Bab al-Mandeb; this would cut the 1200-kilometer bypass oil pipeline to Yanbu and stop exports of up to 7 million barrels per day (about 1.11 million m3/day), while simultaneously ending the 2022 Riyadh-Houthis ceasefire. An unstable ceasefire is also undesirable: even if Iran signs a deal, it may become more militarized and more consolidated, while gaining greater leverage through de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz.

To hedge, Saudi Arabia first reconciled with Turkey in 2022, signed a military agreement with Pakistan in 2025, and sought mediation with Iran together with Egypt and other “middle powers.” But this emerging platform has limited practical influence over Washington, Israel, and Tehran. Although the United Arab Emirates could be a natural partner, it leans toward escalation to try to change Tehran’s regime and is less supportive of mediation; Europe also struggles to arm itself. In this situation, resuming war or accepting a fragile deal both damage U.S. allies; for Washington, the least harmful path is to seriously heed Saudi concerns and end this war, where allies’ security and economies were already staked as gambles.