主要证据显示正式出口管制与持续市场流动之间存在紧张关系。北京已多次收紧两用物项限制，包括在2024年9月扩大的管制方案，涵盖飞控与马达等与战场相关的零件；同时，美国以涉嫌向俄罗斯销售为由制裁了2家中国企业。然而，Aosheng Pusztaszeri引用的贸易数据指出一项重大落差：2024年上半年中国对基辅的官方无人机出口约为200000美元，而乌克兰估计接近1100000000美元，差距约为5500:1，这与经由第三方中介改道而非透过直接申报渠道的情况一致。
侯炳赫伯特・宋的技术评估指出，宣传中的系统结合了侦测与干扰，透过射频干扰，并且有时对 GPS、北斗（BDS）、GLONASS 与 Galileo 相关定位实施导航欺骗。这些影片通常省略了严谨评估所需的作战指标，例如蜂群规模、无人机速度、侦测延迟与完整交战包线，且多半只提及射程宣称。部分产品宣称具备 3 种功能（侦测、干扰、欺骗）并可每日 24 小时连续运作，但宋认为在展示的类别下，面对大型无人机蜂群时能力将受限，这意味著行销曝光度很高，但在复杂条件下的战场效能仍不确定。
WIRED reports that TikTok has become a retail-style channel for Chinese anti-drone hardware, where presenters market signal-jamming devices with casual ecommerce language despite clear security and military relevance. Reviewed listings include anti-drone rifles, tripod dome units, large handheld jammers, and backpack systems with 12 antennas, with multilingual captions in Chinese, English, Russian, and Ukrainian; one product is promoted as a "9 band FPV anti drone jammer." The article situates this in the broader drone war economy linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (since early 2022) and notes heavy dependence on manufacturing clusters around Shenzhen for key components such as processors, sensors, cameras, motors, and radio modules.
The main evidence shows a tension between formal export controls and continued market flow. Beijing has repeatedly tightened dual-use restrictions, including an expanded control package in September 2024 covering battlefield-relevant parts like flight controllers and motors, while the US sanctioned 2 Chinese firms for alleged sales to Russia. Yet trade data cited by Aosheng Pusztaszeri indicates a major discrepancy: official Chinese drone exports to Kyiv were about USD 200000 in H1 2024, versus a Ukrainian estimate near USD 1100000000, a gap of roughly 5500:1, consistent with rerouting through third-party intermediaries rather than direct declared channels.
Technical assessment from Houbing Herbert Song indicates the advertised systems combine detection and jamming, using radio-frequency interference and sometimes navigation spoofing against GPS, BeiDou (BDS), GLONASS, and Galileo-linked positioning. The videos generally omit operational metrics needed for rigorous evaluation, such as swarm size, drone speed, detection latency, and full engagement envelopes, and mostly reference only range claims. Some products advertise 3 functions (detect, jam, spoof) and continuous operation at 24 hours per day, but Song suggests the showcased categories would be limited against large drone swarms, implying strong marketing visibility but uncertain battlefield effectiveness under complex conditions.