当 Xi Jinping 于周四在北京会见美国领导人 Donald Trump 时，他提出了一个问题：中国与美国是否能避免「修昔底德陷阱」？这个概念由 Harvard 政治学者 Graham Allison 在 2010年代初期根据修昔底德的著作而广为人知。Allison 的核心论点是，当一个崛起中的强权挑战既有强权时，冲突往往随之而来，而他正是用这个框架来分析美中竞争。该文章将这一想法呈现为一种结构性视角，用以理解中国在经济、技术与军事实力上的崛起，如何对美国长期的全球主导地位形成压力。

根据北京分析人士 Zichen Wang 的说法，Xi 使用这个说法至少可追溯到 2014 年；而他更近期又在 2024 年 11 月于秘鲁举行的 APEC 会议场边，与 President Joe Biden 会面时再次提到。北京方面一直传达的讯息是，冲突并非不可避免，两国应透过「相互尊重」与「互利共赢合作」共存。然而在 Washington，官员们对这个词通常更为谨慎，并偏好聚焦于护栏与风险管理的表述，而不是戏剧化的历史类比。

援引修昔底德陷阱也为北京带来一项战略目的，即把美中紧张关系提升到贸易争端或 Taiwan 之上，并将其框定为一场关于大国如何互动的更广泛考验。这强化了中国主张自己是与美国平起平坐的超级大国，而非附属者，同时也迫使双方思考是否能建立一种「大国关系新范式」。文章没有提出任何确切的统计衡量，但强调这个概念近年来被反复使用，至少自 2014 年以来一直是 Xi 外交讯息的重要部分，并在 2024 年仍然如此，凸显这场竞争的长期性。

When Xi Jinping met US leader Donald Trump in Beijing on Thursday, he raised the question of whether China and the US can avoid the “Thucydides Trap,” a concept popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison in the early 2010s from the writings of Thucydides. Allison’s core argument is that when a rising power challenges an established one, conflict tends to follow, and he used that framework to analyze the US-China rivalry. The article presents the idea as a structural lens for understanding how China’s rise in economic, technological, and military power pressures America’s long-standing global dominance.

Xi’s use of the phrase dates back to at least 2014, according to Beijing-based analyst Zichen Wang, and he repeated it more recently in a meeting with President Joe Biden in November 2024 on the sidelines of the APEC gathering in Peru. Beijing’s message has remained that conflict is not inevitable and that the two countries should coexist through “mutual respect” and “win-win cooperation.” In Washington, however, officials are generally more cautious about the term and prefer language focused on guardrails and risk management rather than dramatic historical analogies.

Invoking the Thucydides Trap also serves a strategic purpose for Beijing by lifting US-China tensions above trade disputes or Taiwan and framing them as a broader test of how major powers interact. It reinforces China’s claim to be a superpower peer rather than a subordinate, while also pressuring both sides to consider whether they can build a “new paradigm of major country relations.” The article offers no hard statistical measure, but it emphasizes that the concept has been used repeatedly in recent years and remains a key part of Xi’s diplomatic messaging at least since 2014, including in 2024, underscoring the long-running nature of the rivalry.