文中提出的证据同时具量化与政治面向：每年能源相关 CO2 排放仍高于 35,000 million metric tons (35 Gt)；即使在已宣布政策的假设下，预计到本世纪中叶仍将高于 25,000 million metric tons (25 Gt)，且在接下来约 25 年几乎没有明显变化。需求端走势也与早先的 net-zero 情境明显背离：模型曾预测到 2030 石油需求降至略高于 70 million barrels/day（约 11.1 million m3/day），到 2050 约 25 million barrels/day（约 4.0 million m3/day）；但实际消费接近 105 million barrels/day（约 16.7 million m3/day），且预计明年约 106 million barrels/day（约 16.9 million m3/day）。在 2026 IEA 会议上，据称 Fatih Birol 提到「energy security」8 次、「affordability」4 次、「climate」2 次、「net zero」0 次；同时 Sophie Hermans 与 Chris Wright 等官员也明确强调产业存续，以及在 2050 达成 net-zero 目标的机率趋近于零。
文章的核心意涵不是再生能源正在失败，而是政策正从二元的 net-zero 教条，转向混合系统的现实主义：化石燃料仍维持高位，而新增供给越来越多由 solar、wind、hydro、geothermal 与其他低碳来源提供。Blas 强调这种思维正被快速转化为政策，并举例丹麦在会后考虑把北海油气活动延长至 2050，以强化欧洲供应安全。就统计而言，预期路径是排放先见顶、再缓步下降至约 30,000 million metric tons/year (30 Gt/year)，可能到 25,000 million metric tons/year (25 Gt/year)；这虽明显低于当前水准，但仍远高于零。其但书是：目前看来，主导性限制变数已是对转型成本的政治接受度，而不仅是能源物理约束本身。
Javier Blas argues that global energy diplomacy has pivoted away from “net zero” by tracing language at International Energy Agency ministerials: the term appeared 13 times in 2022, 15 times in 2024, and only 1 time in 2026, where it was framed as lacking universal backing. Net zero originally meant reducing emissions to residual levels by 2050 so removals balance outputs, but the article says this target was always structurally implausible given persistent fossil dependence and the scale of current emissions. The framing shift reflects a broader policy reprioritization from an absolute decarbonization endpoint toward energy security, affordability, and industrial competitiveness.
The evidence presented is quantitative and political: annual energy-related CO2 emissions remain above 35,000 million metric tons (35 Gt) and, even under announced-policy assumptions, are projected to stay above 25,000 million metric tons (25 Gt) through mid-century, with little change over roughly the next 25 years. Demand-side trajectories also diverge sharply from earlier net-zero scenarios: oil demand was modeled to fall to just above 70 million barrels/day by 2030 (about 11.1 million m3/day) and about 25 million barrels/day by 2050 (about 4.0 million m3/day), but actual consumption is near 105 million barrels/day (about 16.7 million m3/day) and expected around 106 million barrels/day (about 16.9 million m3/day) next year. At the 2026 IEA meeting, Fatih Birol reportedly said “energy security” 8 times, “affordability” 4 times, “climate” 2 times, and “net zero” 0 times, while officials such as Sophie Hermans and Chris Wright explicitly emphasized industrial survival and the near-zero probability of hitting 2050 net-zero goals.
The article’s core implication is not that renewables are failing, but that policy is moving from a binary net-zero doctrine to a mixed-system realism where fossil fuels remain high while incremental growth is increasingly supplied by solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and other low-carbon sources. Blas highlights rapid policy translation of this mindset, citing Denmark’s post-meeting consideration of extending North Sea oil and gas activity through 2050 to strengthen European supply security. Statistically, the expected path is an emissions peak and gradual decline toward about 30,000 million metric tons/year (30 Gt/year), potentially 25,000 million metric tons/year (25 Gt/year), which is materially below current levels but still far above zero; the caveat is that political acceptance of transition costs, rather than physical energy constraints alone, now appears to be the dominant limiting variable.