机制层面，外资卖出可能导致美元走弱、政府与企业可得资本池缩小；进口成本上升与借贷利率抬升，可能形成「赤字恶化—成长下滑」的负回馈循环。市场曾在关税冲击后出现股、债、汇同跌且迫使政策退让；虽短期波动有限，但文本声称美元自其再度执政以来约下跌10%，并接近2022年以来弱位。风险来源包括：2025年5月信用评等机构下调至失去最后一个顶级评等，30年期殖利率一度升破5%；关税提高跨国企业成本与不确定性；对央行独立性的疑虑使投资人担心不当降息推升通膨并侵蚀美元购买力。
行为证据以象征性个案呈现：丹麦退休基金宣布撤出约1亿美元美国国债部位；相对于约30兆美元国债市场规模属极小比例，但具讯号意义；荷兰退休基金亦表示转向、聚焦欧洲科技。替代配置与相关趋势包含：金属价格自前一年上涨并延续至2026年、日本利率上行被视为相对吸引；同时存在「贬值交易」将资金转入黄金、白银与比特币，使难以判定是否专指卖出美国资产。存量结构上，外国人按市值约持有美国证券21%，约持有国债三分之一、公司债约27%、股票约18%；主要外国国债持有人中，日本约1.2兆美元居首，其次为英国与中国。文本亦强调「完全卖出」困难：美国企业盈余增长在过去十年显著领先，科技与数位生态系竞争者稀少，人工智慧投资被视为可能进一步加深集中；其他高收益市场（如澳洲、纽西兰、英国）规模较小，欧元与人民币受结构性限制，短期难以取代美元。
Dated February 2, 2026 at 22:24 (UTC+8), the text explains why even a hint of a “Sell America” narrative can rattle global markets: despite the US having the world’s deepest and most liquid financial markets, the dollar’s dominant role, and Treasuries’ safe-haven status, any foreign shift toward reducing allocations could simultaneously hit the exchange rate, the supply of capital, and financing costs. It traces the narrative’s origin to the April 2025 “Liberation Day” tariff shock and says it flared again in early January 2026 amid political tensions over Greenland.
Mechanically, foreign selling could weaken the dollar and shrink the capital pool available to the US government and companies; with pricier imports and higher borrowing rates, that can create a negative feedback loop of “worse deficits → weaker growth.” The text points to the post-tariff episode when stocks, bonds, and the dollar fell together and policy eventually retreated, and adds that while the initial turmoil was short-lived, the dollar is down about 10% since Trump returned to office and is near its weakest level since 2022. It highlights risk triggers including a May 2025 downgrade that removed the last top credit rating, a 30-year Treasury yield that briefly rose above 5%, higher costs and uncertainty from tariffs, and worries about Federal Reserve independence—fearing inappropriate rate cuts could lift inflation and erode the dollar’s purchasing power.
Behavioral “evidence” is presented via symbolic cases: Denmark’s AkademikerPension said it would exit about $100 million of US Treasury holdings—tiny versus a roughly $30 trillion Treasury market but meaningful as a signal—and the Dutch fund PME said it was pivoting away from US assets and focusing on European technology. Alternatives and related trends mentioned include metals prices rising since the prior year and continuing into 2026, Japan becoming more attractive as rates rise, and a broader “debasement trade” shifting into gold, silver, and Bitcoin, which complicates whether flows are specifically a US-asset boycott. On holdings, foreigners are said to own about 21% of US securities by market value, about one-third of Treasuries, about 27% of corporate debt, and about 18% of equities; among major foreign Treasury holders Japan is about $1.2 trillion (largest), followed by the UK and China, and the text argues a complete “Sell America” is difficult because US earnings growth has outpaced other regions over the past decade, US tech ecosystems have few rivals, and the euro and yuan face structural limits that make replacing the dollar unlikely in the near term.