荷兰法学家 Cornelius van Bynkershoek 在 1702 年提出的「炮弹射程」原则，最初把海洋管辖权简化为从岸边可达炮弹距离的几何界线。三百多年后，这个原则仍以另一种形式存在：如今是飞弹与无人机划定霍尔木兹海峡的实际控制。最新一轮升级中，美国与伊朗在周二夜里达成了为期两周的暂定停火，暂停了已持续六周的冲突。即便后续达成最终协议，本文认为海峡已由战前相对自由航道转变为至少受控通道，因为全球每五分之一（20%）的海运石油与液化天然气流经该通道。

在战前，航行大致被视为开放；但这次停火期间显示，伊朗在实务上可限制船舶动态，并要求许可，周三清晨仅有少量船只通过。唐纳·川普表示他要「完整、立即且安全」航行，却同时转发伊朗讯息，暗示目前航行须受军方控制。关键法律争点在于霍尔木兹是否能回到联合国海洋法公约（UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS）下的体制，因为美国与伊朗都未批准该公约，虽然两者都在实际上遵循其部分规定。这为双方重新设计治理框架留下了空间。

可行结果可能会参照先例：1857 年《声索关税赎回条约》于丹麦海峡生效，及 1936 年《蒙特勒条约》治理博斯普鲁斯海峡。两者都把名义上的自由通行与沿岸国监管结合，例如引水服务或防止石油外溢费用，并对实际过境保留实质限制。伊朗可藉可见控制取得威慑价值，且即使不实行绝对封锁，也可持续影响市场。然而区域适应正在稀释这种杠杆：沙乌地阿拉伯与阿拉伯联合大公国可能扩展既有绕道输油管线，科威特或加入其列，伊拉克也可能重建经由土耳其通往地中海的南向战略管线。五年内，波斯湾预计将拥有实质更多的绕道运能，无论最终外交文本如何，霍尔木兹在全球能源流动中的核心地位都将下降。

The cannon-shot rule first articulated by Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek in 1702 once linked maritime jurisdiction to a simple geometric distance from shore. More than 300 years later, the principle persists in another form: missiles and drones now mark practical control of the Strait of Hormuz. In the latest escalation, the US and Iran reached a tentative two-week ceasefire on Tuesday night, pausing a six-week conflict. Even if a final settlement follows, the analysis argues the strait has already shifted from a relatively free sea lane to at least a controlled corridor, because around one-fifth (20%) of global seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas flows through this passage. It notes that the war-time period redefines baseline expectations about who can restrict movement, even when pre-war claims sounded like free passage.

Before the war, passage was broadly seen as open, but this ceasefire period showed that in practice Tehran could restrict movement and require permission, with only a few vessels crossing by Wednesday morning. Donald Trump said he wanted complete, immediate, and safe navigation, yet simultaneously reposted an Iranian statement implying that passage is currently military-controlled. The key legal issue is whether Hormuz can return to a UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, since both the US and Iran have not ratified that convention even though they have effectively followed parts of it. That gives both sides room to redesign governance and to define fees in forms such as pilotage or oil-spill prevention while preserving claims of navigation rights.

Likely outcomes may resemble precedents: the 1857 Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues in the Danish straits and the 1936 Montreux Convention governing the Bosporus. Both combine nominal freedom of passage with coastal-state supervision, such as pilotage services or pollution-prevention fees, while retaining practical limits on transit. Iran gains deterrence value from visible control, while it does not need absolute closure to keep leverage over energy markets. Yet regional adaptation is eroding that leverage: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are likely to expand existing bypass pipelines, Kuwait may join, and Iraq may revive a south-to-Mediterranean strategic pipeline route via Turkey. In five years, the Persian Gulf is expected to have materially greater bypass capacity, so Hormuz is likely to be less central to global energy flows regardless of the final diplomatic wording.