对中国乒乓球迷而言，全球赛事也有一种熟悉的氛围，因为许多国际对决几乎成了“我们的中国人”对“他们的中国人”。在2024年巴黎奥运会上，代表欧洲、拉丁美洲等国家出战的乒乓球选手中，有十几位以上出生并受训于中国。

同样的主导逻辑正被北京投射到经济全球化上：到2026年，“中国走向全球”预计将更频繁出现，更多中企将在海外开设或扩张业务，但把最有价值的环节尽量留在国内。即便欧盟在讨论公共采购的“买欧洲货”本地含量规则，许多产品仍会以中国零部件为主进行海外终装；德国车企从中国出口到欧洲的电动车在中国工厂的制造成本低约40%。

这种结构推动了一个明确趋势：在欧盟商会成员中，把生产转入中国的企业数量是缩减在华活动企业的两倍，且“几乎每一家”参与全球贸易的西方公司都至少面对一个来自中国的同级竞争者并依赖中国供应链。与此同时，美中欧都在走向更强保护主义，跨境数据与知识产权共享受安全法规限制，母公司与在华子公司互相蚕食销售的争议增加，而特朗普施压盟友（如韩国）追加投资也凸显必须让收益更可见、分配更均衡。

For Chinese table-tennis fans, even global tournaments can feel familiar, because many international matches amount to “our Chinese” versus “their Chinese.” At the 2024 Paris Olympics, more than a dozen table-tennis players representing European, Latin American and other countries were Chinese-born and Chinese-trained.

Beijing hopes economic globalisation will echo that dominance: in 2026 “China goes global” is expected to be heard more often, as more Chinese firms expand overseas while keeping their highest-value activities at home. Even as the EU debates “buy European” local-content rules, many operations may remain final assembly built on China-shipped components; German-branded EVs exported from China to Europe are about 40% cheaper to build in Chinese plants.

The trend is quantifiable: among EU Chamber member firms, twice as many are moving production into China as are reducing activity there, and “almost every” Western firm in global trade now faces at least one near-peer competitor from China and leans on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, America, China and Europe are all becoming more protectionist, security laws restrict cross-border data and IP sharing, parent firms fear China-based subsidiaries cannibalising sales, and Trump’s pressure on allies (such as South Korea) underscores that political consent requires visible, more evenly shared gains.

Source: Patriotism tests loom for big business

Subtitle: Economic nationalism makes it harder for multinationals to navigate the world

Dateline: 12月 30, 2025 08:29 上午