特朗普—习近平峰会大多只是象征性的，但它凸显了一场更大的竞逐：即使习近平试图把中国塑造成一个相对于动荡的美国而言更为平静的替代选项，华盛顿仍把中国视为战略对手。特朗普寻求达成协议，部分是为了改善国内支持度疲弱的处境，而习近平则展现耐心与自信；然而文章认为，关于中国崛起与美国衰落的熟悉叙事并不完整，因为美国对中国的政策依然具有深度竞争性，且日益制度化。

支持这一判断的证据包括两党对关税、出口管制、投资限制和产业政策的支持，以及在峰会期间持续对中国企业实施制裁。美国战略如今把重点放在 AI、半导体、生物技术、量子运算和关键矿产的主导地位上，且2025 National Security Strategy 将亚太视为竞争的主要场域，强调盟友与台湾吓阻，并寻求抑制中国在港口、北极与数位基础设施中的影响力。另一方面，中国因支持俄罗斯以及在东海和南海的强势作为仍引发不信任，而 MERICS 报告称，在过去一年中，全球70个最大经济体里有52个发起了新的贸易防御措施或针对中国的调查。

文章的核心结论是，两个超级大国都没有提供负责任的领导：美国在不放弃强硬竞争的同时失去可信度，而中国也没有填补真空，因为其对外援助仍远低于美国历史水准，且往往在不方便时拒绝相关规范。在另一个俄中脉络中，普丁称两国关系前所未有，并对中国进行了他的第25次访问，而俄罗斯依赖中国来削弱制裁，透过中国进口了超过90%的受制裁技术；习近平今年也接待了来自英国、加拿大、西班牙、爱尔兰、南韩和越南的领导人。更广泛的含义是，许多国家宁愿选择第三条路，也不愿在两个追求霸权特权却不愿承担责任的强权之间作出选择。

The Trump-Xi summit was mostly symbolic, but it highlighted a larger contest: Washington still treats China as a strategic rival even as Xi tries to present China as a calm alternative to a disruptive US. Trump sought a deal partly to improve weak domestic standing, while Xi projected patience and confidence; yet the article argues that the familiar story of China's rise and America's decline is incomplete because US policy toward China remains deeply competitive and increasingly institutionalized.

Evidence for that claim includes bipartisan US support for tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions, and industrial policy, plus continued sanctions on Chinese companies during the summit period. The US strategy now targets dominance in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum computing, and critical minerals, and the 2025 National Security Strategy treats the Asia-Pacific as the main arena of competition, emphasizes allies and Taiwan deterrence, and seeks to curb Chinese influence in ports, the Arctic, and digital infrastructure. China, meanwhile, still draws mistrust through support for Russia and assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, while MERICS reported that 52 of the world's 70 largest economies launched new trade defense measures or investigations targeting China over the prior year.

The article's core conclusion is that neither superpower is offering responsible leadership: the US is losing credibility without abandoning hard competition, and China has not filled the vacuum because its foreign aid remains far below historical US levels and it often rejects norms when inconvenient. In the separate Russia-China context, Putin called relations unprecedented and made his 25th visit to China, while Russia depends on China to blunt sanctions, importing more than 90% of its sanctioned technology through China; Xi this year has also hosted leaders from the UK, Canada, Spain, Ireland, South Korea, and Vietnam. The broader implication is that many countries prefer a third option rather than choosing between two powers seeking the privileges of hegemony without the burdens of responsibility.