经济上，Brexit 让英国承受可量化损失：估计英国人均 GDP 比留在 EU 时低 6% 至 8%，2024 年对 EU 的商品出口较 2019 年低 18%，且英国增长疲弱。EU 也受损，失去其第二大经济体、主要金融中心与重要财政贡献者；更广泛的西方则出现民主数量下降、民粹主义与民族主义上升、NATO 与 WTO 受压，以及对美国领导的信任削弱。
Brexit 在 2016 年 6 月 23 日以 51.9% 对 48.1% 的比例通过，与 1979 年 5 月 4 日 Thatcher 当选一样，被视为改变世界走向的关键日期；但文中强调，Brexit 更像是在英国于投票前一年出现接近 63 万人的净移民、且只有 37% 的全体选民支持脱欧的背景下发生的一次偶然性自伤。此后英国政治陷入长期混乱，已更换 5 位首相，只有不到 10% 的受访者认为 Brexit 成功，而约 83% 的年轻英国人支持重新加入 EU。,
The article argues that Brexit, not Trump’s 2016 victory, was the more decisive catalyst for the current nationalist era because it exported populism, deglobalization, and strongman politics across the West. It links Brexit to wider trends: rising trade and immigration barriers, deteriorating political tone, and a shift from neoliberalism to cronyist “neo-royalism,” while noting that the vote’s accidental, contradictory nature made it easier to underestimate its significance at the time.
Quantitatively, the piece highlights the 51.9%–48.1% referendum split, the near-record 630,000 UK arrivals in the year before the vote, the estimate that British GDP per head is 6%–8% lower than if Britain had stayed in the EU’s $18 trillion market, and the 18% drop in 2024 goods exports to the EU versus 2019. It also notes that only about 10% of Britons now call Brexit a success, around 83% of younger Britons favor rejoining, and 2016 saw only 37% of the total electorate vote Leave.
For the EU and the West, Brexit removed one of the EU’s largest budget contributors, its main financial center, and a key transatlantic bridge, while helping normalize the idea that even established democracies are not immune to nationalist backlash. The text ends on cautious optimism: liberal centrism has recovered before, some countries are moving back toward pragmatic governance, and the post-Brexit age may prove shorter than the free-market era—but the underlying pressures of inequality, immigration, climate change, Covid, and AI remain powerful. Even so, the author suggests history can still turn on a single better decision. The article argues that Brexit, not Trump’s 2016 victory, was the more decisive catalyst for the current nationalist era because it exported populism, deglobalization, and strongman politics across the West. It links Brexit to wider trends: rising trade and immigration barriers, deteriorating political tone, and a shift from neoliberalism to cronyist “neo-royalism,” while noting that the vote’s accidental, contradictory nature made it easier to underestimate its significance at the time. Quantitatively, the piece highlights the 51.9%–48.1% referendum split, the near-record 630,000 UK arrivals in the year before the vote, the estimate that British GDP per head is 6%–8% lower than if Britain had stayed in the EU’s $18 trillion market, and the 18% drop in 2024 goods exports to the EU versus 2019. It also notes that only about 10% of Britons now call Brexit a success, around 83% of younger Britons favor rejoining, and 2016 saw only 37% of the total electorate vote Leave. For the EU and the West, Brexit removed one of the EU’s largest budget contributors, its main financial center, and a key transatlantic bridge, while helping normalize the idea that even established democracies are not immune to nationalist backlash. The text ends on cautious optimism: liberal centrism has recovered before, some countries are moving back toward pragmatic governance, and the post-Brexit age may prove shorter than the free-market era—but the underlying pressures of inequality, immigration, climate change, Covid, and AI remain powerful. Even so, the author suggests history can still turn on a single better decision.