中国保险公司可透过把银行持股拉高到超过3%并取得董事/监事席位，主张对被投资方具「重大影响」，将持股重分类为「长期股权投资」并采权益法，进而一次性确认「负商誉」等非经常性收益。大大家保险投资兴业银行即属此例：以2025年第一季平均股价19.5元估算，买入成本约120亿元；当时P/B约0.54，对应其所占净资产约220亿元，差额约100亿元（约14亿美元）可记为帐面获利。
类似操作会大幅扭转报表。幸福人寿于2020年将南京银行持股提高至3.93%，转列长期股权投资后，年末帐面价值达38亿元并确认3.2亿元负商誉收益，使原本可能的亏损变为全年净利9,700万元；其后监管认定资讯不实并要求更正，改回以公允价值计量后，随股价下跌于2023年确认12亿元损失。2024年12月再获董事席位后又恢复权益法，当年净利升至1.95亿元（2023年为净亏1.41亿元），主要来自长期股权投资调整带来的12亿元非营业收入。
中长期风险在于：当银行股长期低于净值（如北京银行P/B约0.4、浙商银行P/B约0.5）时，帐面价值可能膨胀快于现金回报。信泰人寿将北京银行持股扩至4.7%，截至2024年3月帐面值达117亿元；对浙商银行截至2024年9月持股4.99%，投入36亿元却以83亿元入帐。若股利派息率仅约30%或更低，现金回收可能≤帐面利润的1/3，导致有效报酬被稀释、触及单一资产不得超过总资产5%的监管上限，且在市价长期低于帐面时累积减值风险；民生银行P/B自2015年的1降至目前约0.3亦为前例，安邦/大大家相关投资曾以900亿元买入、2019年已现约500亿元帐损，高峰时帐面值达1,000亿元且帐损逾600亿元，并于2023年计提约100亿元减值。
Chinese insurers can book large one-off “negative goodwill” gains by pushing bank stakes above 3% and claiming “significant influence,” then reclassifying holdings as long‑term equity investments under the equity method. Dajia’s Industrial Bank deal illustrates the math: at an average Q1 2025 price of 19.5 yuan, it spent about 12 billion yuan; with a P/B near 0.54, its share of net assets was roughly 22 billion yuan, letting it record a ~10 billion yuan ($1.4bn) paper gain.
Similar tactics have swung reported profits. Happy Life lifted its Bank of Nanjing stake to 3.93% in 2020, booked a 320 million yuan gain and ended with a 3.8 billion yuan carrying value, turning an otherwise loss into 97 million yuan profit; after regulators forced fair‑value treatment, it logged a 1.2 billion yuan loss in 2023, then after renewed board influence in December 2024, profit rebounded to 195 million yuan (from a 141 million yuan loss) on a 1.2 billion yuan non‑operating boost.
The medium‑term risk is that book values can inflate faster than cash returns when bank stocks sit below book (e.g., P/B ~0.4–0.5 for Bank of Beijing and Zheshang Bank while Sinatay built 4.7% and 4.99% stakes; a 3.6 billion yuan Zheshang purchase was carried at 8.3 billion yuan). With dividend payout ratios around 30% or less, cash can be ≤1/3 of paper profit, raising dilution, the 5% single‑asset cap, and impairment risk—echoed by Minsheng Bank’s slide from P/B 1 (2015) to ~0.3 and Dajia’s ~10 billion yuan impairment in 2023.