Setser认为，这波不是传统意义上的以低价、低技术商品为主，也不主要由美国承担；冲击更集中在欧洲工业，尤其是汽车、化工乃至飞机等产业，与“China Shock 2.0”相呼应。欧美政策制定者希望伊朗能源冲击能转向缩小中国顺差，因为中国是净能源进口国，油价上涨在理论上应减少顺差。Brad Setser同意方向正确但效果有限：全球顺差之所以仍高度集中在亚洲，完全是因为这个区域性、尤其是中国的“one really big surplus”规模极大，需要极端的大幅价格变动才可能改变格局。
他也指出，当晶片与油价上涨、而中国同步增加对晶片与石油进口时，这些进口抬高总体进口额，可能掩盖掉“头条”数据中的中国出口顺差缩小信号；但实际上中国制造与生产外移在全球供应链中的集中程度仍在加深，所谓基础失衡正在恶化。问题因此不仅是当季顺差是否缩小，而是实体产能布局是否持续偏离，这将决定欧洲是否能阻止其工业基础被侵蚀、以及美国是否能以对药厂与科技巨头施压来改善其自身贸易逆差。
Against the backdrop of the IMF and World Bank spring meetings in Washington, the FT *Economics Show* discussed global trade imbalances. After the pandemic, the IMF’s report *Imbalances Receding* had suggested that imbalances were easing, but Brad Setser argued on the podcast that evidence from the last two years contradicts that view. He says the central imbalance remains China’s very large export surplus: it widened by about USD 300 billion in 2024 and added another about USD 300 billion in 2025. Over the past five years, China’s imports have been broadly flat while trade volumes surged, and falling Chinese export prices can make headline dollar values understate the real expansion.
Setser added that this is not mainly about low-value goods, and not borne chiefly by the United States. The pressure is instead concentrated in Europe, especially in industries such as automobiles, chemicals, and possibly aircraft, which aligns with the “China Shock 2.0” framing. Western policymakers expected the Iran-linked energy shock to narrow China’s surplus because China is a net oil importer and higher oil prices should, in principle, reduce the surplus. He agreed this effect exists but said it is limited: the concentration of global surplus in Asia is so large that it requires a very large price shock to break that pattern.
He also warned that headline trade numbers can mislead. If chip prices rise and China imports more chips and more oil at the same time, headline figures may show less of a surplus, yet the deeper process can persist. Real production relocation toward China is still increasing and the underlying imbalance can worsen even when top-line dollar figures soften. The core issue is therefore not only whether a given quarter’s export surplus looks smaller, but whether physical production concentration in China is continuing; that determines whether Europe can protect its industrial base and whether the U.S. can pressure domestic pharma and tech firms in ways that materially reduce its own deficit.