这篇社论的作者Noah Feldman认为，在美国宪法下，无论在伊朗、委内瑞拉还是利比亚，针对国家领导人的军事打击仍然是战争行为。 他否认任何道德化的例外，强调宪法要求国会宣战或授权使用武力。 原始宪政设计不仅把法律权限放在国会，也把实际杠杆放在国会手中：当时没有常备军，也没有经拨款就不能长期作战。 在二战后的时代，这种平衡被侵蚀，因为总统获得了全球打击能力、先进的武器库和庞大的常备军力量，使得开战可以与宪法几乎没有即时摩擦地开始。

2026年2月时的这一议题背景下，Noah Feldman指出：伊朗、委内瑞拉和利比亚的事件并非特殊例外；即便击毙了如Ali Khamenei或逮捕了Nicolás Maduro，或推翻了Muammar Qaddafi，仍是美国宪法意义上的战争。该制度最关键的变化体现在1973年国会通过《战争权力决议》，以应对Richard Nixon在越南战争中对Cambodia与Laos的未经授权扩大战事。决议要求总统在48小时内通知国会，并在未获授权的情况下仅可持续军事行动60天，若到期前未获授权则缺乏法律依据。

即便如此，执行并不稳定：Clinton在Kosovo行动中在60天期满后又持续空袭了2周，未获国会授权；Obama政府则将Libya空袭定义为“不构成敌对状态”，理由是任务有限、空中作战且美军风险有限，但该观点与DOJ和DoD内部意见冲突。Noah Feldman称，这种解释为“有限空中战争”提供了长期可重复的法律空间，使总统几乎可在无需国会授权下实施军事行动。过去几十年的趋势是由总统先行、国会被边缘化。即使Trump可能否决或回避任何象征性决议，伊朗战争是否持续超过60天并不改变其“战争”属性；其合法性不能由政权是否崩溃或美军是否“无伤”决定。对他而言，Hostilities就应被理解为Hostilities。国会应尽可能推动并通过决议，哪怕只是象征性，因为这是国会剩余的宣战权最后的制度外壳。

The author, Noah Feldman, argues that under the U.S. Constitution, military strikes against national leaders—whether in Iran, Venezuela, or Libya—remain acts of war. He rejects any moralized exception and insists that only Congress can declare war or authorize force. In the original constitutional design, legal authority and practical leverage both sat with Congress: there was no standing army, and no prolonged fighting without appropriations. In the post-World War II era, this balance eroded as presidents gained global strike capacity, powerful arsenals, and large permanent forces, allowing wars to begin with little immediate constitutional friction.

In this context, these cases are not exceptional. Whether Iran’s strike killed Ali Khamenei, the United States seized Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, or Libya’s 2011 campaign removed Muammar Qaddafi, the legal category remains war under the Constitution. Congress tried to constrain this through the 1973 War Powers Resolution, passed after Richard Nixon’s unauthorized expansion into Cambodia and Laos during Vietnam. It requires presidential notification within 48 hours and allows military operations for only 60 days without authorization; if Congress does not approve or block action in that window, hostilities become formally unlawful.

Enforcement has repeatedly proved fragile. President Bill Clinton extended bombing in Kosovo for two additional weeks after the 60-day period without authorization. Later, the Obama administration argued that Libyan airstrikes were not “hostilities” because the mission was limited, air-only, and risk was limited, despite disagreement from DOJ and DoD. Feldman says this interpretation created a durable loophole for unilateral air wars. The longer trend, in his view, is executive primacy: presidents act first, legislatures are sidelined. Even if Trump resists, Iran’s war may last beyond 60 days—or not—but its constitutional character is unchanged. Legality cannot depend on whether a regime collapses, as Qaddafi’s did, or survives as Iran might, nor on claims of force invulnerability. Hostilities should mean hostilities. Congress should still pass a War Powers resolution, even if mostly symbolic, because it is the last institutional remnant of the framers’ war-declaration power, and losing it shifts constitutional balance in the wrong direction.