波兰外交部长兼副总理拉代克·西科尔斯基撰文强调，西方必须清醒认识到欧洲根本无法保护俄罗斯免于自身的制度溃败，过度畏惧局势升级只会助长莫斯科的侵略野心。早在1953年斯大林去世后，《经济学人》就曾指出世界虽更健康却未必更安全；冷战结束以来的数十年间，西方曾竭力避免羞辱俄罗斯，1997年不仅邀请其加入G7，还签署了《北约-俄罗斯成立法案》并缔结欧盟伙伴协定；2009年波兰更邀请普京出席二战爆发70周年纪念并推行加里宁格勒免签政策。然而，克里姆林宫彻底拒绝了这一融入国际社会的努力，如今再度利用核威胁与战略升级来迫使西方妥协。

外界关于严厉制裁将导致俄罗斯解体或引发更危险权贵上台的担忧被严重夸大。当今俄罗斯不同于苏联，除北加里加索地区外，俄罗斯族在全国人口中占据压倒性多数，且民众对苏联解体引发的经济政治混乱记忆犹新，极大地抑制了地方分离主义倾向。俄罗斯历经数百年形成的高度集权体制使得各地方在财政、行政和能源交通基础设施上极度依赖莫斯科中央调拨，数百万民众依附于联邦预算支持。因此，一旦政权遭遇领导层危机或严重军事溃败，其最可能的结果是统治集团内部在中央争夺控制权，而非国家分崩离析。

面对克里姆林宫长期运用的无人机袭扰、网络攻击、物理破坏、GPS干扰和虚假信息等混合战争手段，欧洲若因恐惧而过早开启谈判，将正中其下怀。过早的政治妥协不仅无法实现持久和平，反而会增强普京在国内的执政合法性，加深民主阵营内部的分歧，并侵蚀欧洲对乌克兰的关键防务支持。欧洲必须在短期内承担更大的战略风险与对峙成本，以压倒性的威慑决心向普京明确证明军事升级绝无出路，唯有如此才能从根本上保障欧洲长期的地缘安全。

Polish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Radek Sikorski contends that European powers cannot shield Russia from internal dysfunction, warning that appeasement driven by escalation fears merely emboldens Kremlin aggression. Historical attempts to accommodate Moscow post-1991—including its 1997 inclusion in the G7, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, bilateral EU agreements, and Poland's 2009 diplomatic outreaches and Kaliningrad visa-waivers—were systematically rebuffed. Despite current Russian threats regarding Western military support for Ukraine and aggressive hybrid operations, European policymakers must recognize that recurring nuclear and conventional escalation threats represent an established coercive playbook designed to paralyze democratic resistance.

Apprehensions regarding catastrophic Russian state fragmentation under sustained economic and military pressure are structurally overstated. Unlike the multi-ethnic Soviet Union, modern Russia maintains an overwhelming ethnic Russian majority outside the North Caucasus, while collective memory of post-Soviet collapse suppresses regional separatism. Centuries of administrative centralization render provincial governments and resource sectors entirely dependent on federal transfers and Moscow-controlled transport infrastructure. Consequently, acute battlefield defeats or elite fractures would catalyze centralized palace succession struggles rather than territorial disintegration, eliminating Western justifications for withholding decisive material pressure.

Premature diplomatic overtures or concessions would confer domestic legitimacy upon Vladimir Putin, fracture allied consensus, and incentivize further hybrid incursions encompassing sabotage, drone provocations, and GPS spoofing across NATO territory. European leaders must accept localized short-term geopolitical friction to prevent systemic long-term instability. The primary strategic obligation of democratic nations is defending collective European territory rather than shielding Moscow from the inevitable domestic costs of its own revanchist overreach.

Source: Europe cannot protect Russia from itself

Subtitle: Fear of Vladimir Putin going fully rogue has paralysed the West for long enough, writes Radek Sikorski

Dateline: Sep 3rd 2026