中国中央经济工作会议延续12月政治局会议的相对稳健讯号：短期「大刺激」预期可能落空，但2026年上半年仍可能加力；要达到作者对2026年4.8%的增长预测，政策支持几乎不可或缺。文章判断中国正走向「日本式」高频刺激：不太像会出现断崖式失速，但增速将随时间放缓，取决于刺激的频率与力度。

结构性问题是「产出多、消费/就业/利润不足」，工业利润自2022年以来几乎没增长，且2025年前11个月固定资产投资出现「有纪录以来最大降幅」。回顾历史：2001-2008年出口年均增长11%，全球份额由4%升至15%（峰值）；金融危机后转向基建与房地产，2008年实质GDP一度仅6.5%，2009年基建投资增速超过60%，此后至2018年平均约20%。IMF估算2021年房地产与基建合计占最终需求约三分之一。

房地产与信用扩张的脆弱性促成2020年8月「三条红线」；房地产贷款增速2017年曾达27%，自2023年底以来不再增长。接棒的工业政策在「高质量发展」下推动工业贷款增速由2019年的5%升至2023年的32%创高，但如今已回落至10%，产能过剩压缩利润。例子包括：汽车业2024年仅约50%产能利用率；2025年上半年十大光伏企业仅2家盈利；人造钻设定每克拉15美元底价而生产需一周。地方政府承担超80%财政支出、贴近近4,000家银行，且研究称逾四分之一民企与三分之一国企亏损，让「内卷」更易在宏观层面固化。

China’s Central Economic Work Conference echoed December’s Politburo message: near-term “big stimulus” expectations may be disappointed, but more support is likely in 1H 2026; the author’s 2026 growth forecast of 4.8% effectively requires it. The piece argues China is entering a Japan-style frequent-stimulus phase—less risk of a sharp slump, but a slower trend pace determined by how often and how forcefully policy intervenes.

The core imbalance is “plenty of production, too little consumption/employment/profits.” Industrial profits have barely grown since 2022, and fixed-asset investment in the first 11 months of 2025 shows the largest decline on record. Historically, exports led growth from 2001–2008: 11% average annual export growth and global share rising from 4% to a 15% peak. After the financial crisis, policy pivoted to infrastructure and housing; real GDP slowed to 6.5% in 2008, infrastructure investment rose over 60% in 2009 and averaged about 20% through 2018; the IMF estimates real estate plus infrastructure were about one-third of final demand in 2021.

Property fragilities culminated in the “three red lines” (Aug 2020): real-estate lending growth peaked at 27% in 2017 and has not grown since end-2023. Industry then took the baton—industrial lending growth rose from 5% (2019) to a record 32% (2023)—but is back to 10% as overproduction erodes margins. Evidence includes autos running at 50% capacity in 2024, only 2 of the top 10 solar-panel makers profitable in 1H 2025, and a $15-per-carat price floor for lab diamonds that take a week to produce. With local governments doing 80%+ of fiscal spending near nearly 4,000 banks, and research citing over one-quarter of private firms and one-third of SOEs loss-making, “involution” can persist without deeper restructuring.