在两会上，核心信号是2026年GDP目标被设定为区间，即4.5%—5.0%，并提出“力争更好”。这是第三次如此：2016年为6.5%—7.0%，实际6.7%；2019年为6.0%—6.5%，实际6.1%。与此前预期相比下调0.5个百分点，因此被解读为对不确定性的有计划弹性，而非单纯的算术调整。核心指标基本稳定：城镇调查失业率约5.5%，城镇就业增量超过1200万，CPI约2%，居民收入增长大致与GDP同步，国际收支基本平衡。

财政政策成为扩张焦点。官方数据显示：赤字率4.0%、赤字额5.89万亿元、财政支出突破30万亿元。新增国债规模11.89万亿元；中央对地方转移支付10.42万亿元，连续第四年超过10万亿元。按人均口径，财政支出已超过2万元，高于十年前不足1.5万元。尽管这一赤字率低于美国6%和日本10%，但若按更宽口径计入地方赤字、地方债券、隐性债务和准财政支出，实际赤字可能上升到8%以上。预算中的1.3万亿元超长期特别债券和4.2万亿元地方专项债也表明地方财力仍承压，同时民生支出占比接近30%，是近期规划中的最高水平。

技术被当作下一个增长引擎：郑栅洁指出，六大新兴产业2025年约6万亿元，预计2030年超过10万亿元；AI在“十四五”末有望突破10万亿元，北斗五年内超过1万亿元。然而3月初的上市公司数据显示，已披露预告的1442家中有49%预计亏损。万科预计亏损820亿元，前18家光伏公司合计超400亿元。空调方面，中国全年生产超过2亿台，占全球2.21亿台的很大部分，国内销量1.02亿台；而2.5—2.7亿台产能对应仅72%利用率，2023年家庭每百户有145.9台，平均约1.5台。大型科技目标与普遍亏损之间的缺口显示，经济正从资本和利润逻辑转向技术逻辑，而增长取决于Joseph Schumpeter所说的“创造性破坏”：企业家替代带来的持续结构重构，而非行政命令。

At the NPC, the key signal was that the 2026 GDP target was set as a range, 4.5%–5.0%, with a pledge to “strive for better results.” This is only the third time this has occurred: 2016 (6.5%–7.0%, actual 6.7%) and 2019 (6.0%–6.5%, actual 6.1%). The 0.5-point reduction from earlier expectations is interpreted as planned flexibility under uncertainty rather than a purely arithmetic change. Core indicators stayed stable: urban unemployment about 5.5%, urban job gains above 12 million, CPI around 2%, income growth roughly tracking GDP, and external balance roughly even.

Fiscal policy became the expansion area. Officially: deficit rate 4.0%, deficit amount 5.89 trillion yuan, and total expenditure over 30 trillion. New government bonds reached 11.89 trillion yuan; central-to-local transfers were 10.42 trillion yuan, for a fourth year above 10 trillion. Per-capita fiscal spending is now over 20,000 yuan, versus under 15,000 a decade ago. Even though this headline is lower than the U.S. 6% and Japan’s 10%, broader accounting that includes local deficits, local bonds, implicit debt, and quasi-fiscal channels may push effective deficit above 8%. The budget’s 1.3-trillion ultra-long-term bonds and 4.2-trillion local special bonds also imply local finance stress, and welfare-related outlays near 30%, the highest share in recent plans.

Technology is presented as the next growth engine: Zheng Shanjie said six emerging sectors reached about 6 trillion yuan in 2025 and may exceed 10 trillion by 2030; AI may pass 10 trillion by the end of the 15th Five-Year Plan, and BeiDou above 1 trillion within five years. Yet by early March, 1,442 listed companies (49% of those with disclosed forecasts) expected losses. Vanke was forecast to lose 82 billion yuan, and top-18 photovoltaic firms over 400 billion. In air conditioners, China produced over 200 million of the global 2.21 hundred-million units and sold 102 million domestically, while 250–270 million capacity gives only 72% utilization and 145.9 units per 100 households in 2023. The gap between large-tech targets and widespread losses shows the shift from capital/profit logic toward technology, where growth depends on Joseph Schumpeter’s creative destruction through entrepreneurial replacement, not policy decree.