《Wired》整理自专家访谈与公开资讯指出，美国正讨论是否派地面部队赴伊朗夺取高浓缩铀，但官方仍未揭露会部署何种兵力、如何取回与后续去向。前国务卿 Marco Rubio 曾称「People are going to have to go and get it」，而《华尔街日报》报导也出现五角大厦可能派遣3,000名第82空降师部队的讯息。面对伊朗拒绝特朗普 15 点和平方案及言词升温的背景，分析认为地面行动至少需耗时数周、跨多处非邻近据点同时出击，对美军人员风险极高，核心问题是可行性而非是否愿意行动：要在交火条件下移动、夺取并稳定核设施本身就非常困难。

依据国际原子能总署与军事公开资讯，Isfahan 被认为集中持有伊朗约60%高浓缩铀；武器级通常为90%。Hackett估算目标点可能达10处，包含 Isfahan、Arak、Darkhovin、Natanz、Fordow、Parchin、Saghand、Chine、Yazd 与 Bushehr。Faragasso补充，主要浓缩、研究反应炉与矿场多为地下设施，且上半年6月空袭后部分受创、又有回填行为，导致进入环境恶化。被夺取的物质大多为六氟化铀，存于大型水泥槽内；若槽体受损，材料可能不稳定、危险且难以搬运。

行动模型大致是先空袭「软化」战场，再接著特种进入。Hackett认为初始打击可能由第82空降师或11th/31st MEU执行，目标在夜间入境；其后JSOC主力的Delta Force或SEAL Team 6突破，后续支援单位随后跟进。即使如此，仍可能遭遇武装抵抗、周边警戒作战并造成伤亡。20th CBRNE司令部或EOD核处置人员需配戴防护装备执行采样与灭活程序，且可能对无法回收渗漏选择现地封存。若成功夺回，争议点是运回美国或就地稀释；Faragasso倾向认为运回美国并降浓缩是较安全方案。Hackett另补充，事后管理可能由DoE接管、DTRA监督安全运输，并存放于高机密地点（可能是New Mexico或Colorado），转运过程则需武装护卫。

The article and experts’ accounts describe a U.S. plan under discussion to seize Iran’s highly enriched uranium while most details remain unclear. Officials have released only limited information: Marco Rubio said troops would have to go and get it, while reporting cited possible deployment of 3,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne. Against the diplomatic standoff after Iran rejected Trump’s 15-point war-end plan, analysts said any ground operation would likely run for weeks, hit several distant sites, and impose extreme risk to American personnel. The core issue, they argue, is not just intent but whether U.S. forces can actually secure, move, and stabilize nuclear assets under fire.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency assessment and public targeting analysis, Isfahan likely holds most of Iran’s estimated 60% highly enriched uranium, while weapon-grade material is typically 90%. Jonathan Hackett estimates up to ten possible targets: Isfahan, Arak, Darkhovin, Natanz, Fordow, Parchin, Saghand, Chine, Yazd, and Bushehr. Spencer Faragasso says many major enrichment, research-reactor, and mining facilities are buried or partly buried, and several were damaged and backfilled after June air raids, reducing easy access. Retrieved material would likely be uranium hexafluoride in large cement vats; if ruptured, it could become hazardous, unstable, and difficult to lift and transport.

Likely sequencing begins with air bombardment to soften the area, then special-entry assault. Hackett says initial strikes could come from the 82nd Airborne or 11th/31st Marine Expeditionary Units and likely occur at night; JSOC forces, probably Delta Force or SEAL Team 6, would then breach with supporting units following. Even this model assumes armed resistance, hard perimeter fights, and likely casualties. Nuclear specialists from the 20th CBRNE Command or EOD teams would then apply protective gear and nuclear-handling procedures, and may choose to leave unrecoverable leaks in place. If seized, options discussed were transporting material to the U.S. versus diluting it on site; Faragasso judges transport-and-blend in the U.S. the safest. Hackett adds that custody would likely pass through DoD/CIA decision points to DOE and DTRA for secure storage, possibly in New Mexico or Colorado, with armed escorts on any movement.