恶化如今可被量化：Rhodium Group 估计，德国对中国的商品出口去年下降 9.3%，降至 10 年低点，较 2022 高点低 23%；同时德国汽车出口在 3 年内下降约 66.7%（原本表述为 two-thirds）。德国去年也首次在资本财与中国的贸易中出现逆差，而国内压力也体现在产业约 124,000 个职位于 1 年内被裁减（EY estimate）；背景是较低价的中国 EV 与在美国关税后转向欧洲的钢铁流入所带来的压力。供应链脆弱事件也推升紧张，包括中国稀土出口限制，以及与中国持有的 Nexperia 在德国业务相关的晶片供应威胁。
Merz 对 Xi Jinping 可能传递的讯息是：包括柏林在内的欧洲，正从纯粹自由贸易正统转向有条件保护。德国如今支持部分防御工具，据报也对「Buy European」的某些要素持开放态度，并正与巴黎及布鲁塞尔协调；同时欧盟执委会正准备一项 Industrial Accelerator Act，将在战略部门设定最低欧洲成分条件。需要保留的是，Merz 仍主张范围要窄、期间要短，且仅作为「last resort」使用；这反映了企业对中国市场的依赖，以及德国的 ordo-liberal 政策本能。然而警告已很明确：若北京不抑制产能过剩、补贴与其他扭曲性做法，更广泛的欧盟保护主义反弹将加剧。
German chancellor Friedrich Merz is set to visit Beijing next week for his first China state trip, but unlike Angela Merkel, who chose Beijing first in Asia in 2006 and visited China more often than Japan across 16 years, and Olaf Scholz, who visited Japan before China, Merz chose India first and did so shortly before the EU concluded a free trade deal with New Delhi last month. This sequencing signals a deliberate de-risking shift as Berlin reassesses an export model built in the 2000s and 2010s on Chinese demand, while Merz has openly warned firms about the “great risk” of overexposure to China.
The deterioration is now quantifiable: Rhodium Group estimates German goods exports to China fell 9.3% last year to a 10-year low, sitting 23% below the 2022 peak, while German car exports dropped by about 66.7% (originally described as two-thirds) over 3 years. Germany also recorded its first trade deficit in capital goods with China last year, and domestic strain is visible in industry job cuts of about 124,000 in 1 year (EY estimate), amid pressure from lower-priced Chinese EVs and steel flows redirected into Europe after US tariffs. Tensions also rose through supply-chain vulnerability episodes, including Chinese rare-earth export restrictions and chip supply threats tied to Chinese-owned Nexperia operations in Germany.
Merz’s likely message to Xi Jinping is that Europe, including Berlin, is moving from pure free-trade orthodoxy toward conditional protection: Germany now backs selected defensive tools, is reportedly open to elements of “Buy European,” and is coordinating with Paris and Brussels as the European Commission prepares an Industrial Accelerator Act with minimum European-content conditions in strategic sectors. The caveat is that Merz still favors narrow scope, limited duration, and “last resort” use, reflecting both corporate dependence on the Chinese market and Germany’s ordo-liberal policy instincts; however, the warning is explicit that if Beijing does not curb overcapacity, subsidies, and other distortive practices, a broader EU protectionist backlash will intensify.