4月28日，阿联酋在全球自20世纪70年代以来最严重的能源危机背景下宣布退出欧佩克，进一步说明该组织的市场支配力长期下滑。阿联酋是第三大出口国，2月产量为360万桶/日，拥有约60万桶/日的备用产能，计划到2027年把总产能提升到500万桶/日，但霍尔木兹海峡受阻时其出口仍受限于单一可通行1.8万桶/日的非海峡通道，布伦特油价在此前后从每桶110美元以上升至约125美元。

脱离欧佩克进一步加剧了阿联酋与沙特在配额上的长期矛盾，也可能持续削弱卡特尔：在海峡重开后，卡特尔剩余的大部分可用备用产能将集中在沙特，而其他成员并不愿意主动减产。沙特可能被迫在维护油价与回收伊朗封锁损失之间抉择，若选择挤出低位供应，就需要更多减产；若选择扩大供应，就可能拉开价格分化并挤出高成本生产者。

此次离会与地区安全和外部关系紧密挂钩，阿联酋在对伊朗袭击受到“过两倍”于其他海湾国家无人机和导弹的压力后更趋向与美国和以色列靠拢。历史上2019年卡塔尔也曾退出且未致命，但此番更明显与中东地缘政治博弈联动，沙特与阿联酋的“高油价需求差异”与各自能源多元化阶段不同，成为价格与财政平衡的关键分歧。

On April 28, the UAE announced it was leaving OPEC amid the worst global energy crisis since the 1970s, reinforcing a long-term decline in OPEC’s dominance. The UAE, the third-largest exporter, was producing 3.6 million barrels a day in February, had about 600,000 b/d spare capacity, aimed to raise total capacity to 5 million b/d by 2027, and still faced export limits through a 1.8 million b/d route while Hormuz was closed, while Brent moved from above $110 to around $125 per barrel around the announcement.

The exit intensifies the UAE-Saudi quota dispute and gradually weakens the cartel because nearly all remaining spare capacity would sit in Saudi Arabia, while other members are reluctant to cut output. When Hormuz reopens, Riyadh may have to choose between deeper cuts to defend prices or higher production to squeeze out higher-cost producers, a tension sharpened because Saudi finances require a higher oil price than the UAE’s to stabilize budgets.

In Israeli politics, Bennett and Lapid’s new Together alliance represents about one-fifth of the electorate and seeks a consolidated anti-Netanyahu bloc, but proportional representation means they still need at least one more partner to lead. Their earlier coalition lasted barely a year, and the campaign is likely to emphasize blame for the October 2023 Hamas-attack failures and unequal reserve-service burdens rather than prioritizing Gaza or a Palestinian state agenda.

Source: This is not a drill

Dateline: The Economist May 2nd 2026