作者把下滑起点追溯到1980—90年代：工人阶级工业基础缩小、收入在投票中的重要性下降；高等教育快速扩张带来社会自由化，使受过大学教育的专业选民觉得中右翼文化过时。2008年金融危机后，民粹右翼常能以「反建制」姿态得利；重要节点包括2012年的义大利「兄弟党」、2013年的西班牙Vox与同年因反对欧元纾困而成立、后来被极右派系主导的德国AfD，以及2015年移民激增与2016年特朗普当选。作者引用一项2022年研究（回顾40年的「迎合策略」）称：中右翼越收紧移民政策，既有激进右翼政党反而越受益，并以英国保守党在2024年选举的做法为例。
追逐非大学、较低收入选民也削弱了中右翼的经济可信度：美国的债务取向可追溯到1980年代里根时期；特朗普进一步拥抱关税；英国则在2022年推动「无财源支撑」的减税而失去财政自律形象。作者并提到多国公共债务快速上升、甚至被预测到2029年将达到二战后最高水准，导致中右翼在债务、移民、外交（如援乌）与对威权的容忍度上分裂。文章也指出仍可能存在「温和中右翼」空间，例如2025年英国社会态度调查显示对加税与扩支的反对上升，但在品牌受损与媒体／社群极化下，重建旧联盟将更难。
A Jan. 2, 2026 commentary argues the past decade’s biggest political trend is the collapse of mainstream center-right parties. In the US, establishment Republicans yielded to MAGA; in the UK, Conservatives are being squeezed by Reform UK; and in Germany, Friedrich Merz’s CDU is described as neck-and-neck with the AfD. As radical-right rivals harden migration politics, discard economic orthodoxy, and show more openness to authoritarianism, the next major tests are the 2026 US midterms and France’s 2027 presidential election.
The decline is traced to the 1980s–90s: class-based voting weakened as higher education expanded and social liberalism rose, making graduate professionals less attached to traditional conservatism. After the 2008 financial crisis, the populist right often outmaneuvered a center-left implicated in bailouts and austerity. Milestones include Brothers of Italy (2012), Vox (2013), and Germany’s AfD (founded 2013), followed by the 2015 migration surge and Trump’s 2016 victory. A 2022 study reviewing 40 years of “accommodation” finds that when the center-right tightens immigration policy, established radical-right parties tend to benefit—an argument illustrated with the UK’s 2024 approach.
Chasing these voters also erodes fiscal credibility: US deficit politics dates back to Reagan-era borrowing in the 1980s; Trump added protectionist tariffs; and the UK’s 2022 unfunded tax-cut episode undermined claims of probity. With public debt described as rising rapidly and projected to reach post–World War II highs by 2029, center-right parties are fracturing over debt, immigration, foreign policy, and democratic norms. The piece notes signs of a remaining moderate constituency (e.g., a 2025 British Social Attitudes Survey showing growing resistance to higher taxes and spending), but argues polarized media and damaged party brands make rebuilding coalitions difficult.
