2026年2月24日，在Donald Trump总统领导下，美国加大了对智利的施压，终结了圣地牙哥长期在中国（其最大贸易伙伴）与美国（其主要外国投资来源）之间的平衡策略。在迈阿密拉美保守派峰会前几天、且在José Antonio Kast于3月11日就职前约2周，华盛顿对3名与由中国企业支持的智利—香港海底电缆提案相关的智利官员实施签证限制，同时警告智利需收紧电信投资审查，否则可能失去其美国免签证待遇。
对智利的举动符合更广泛的区域模式：美国在迫使各国做出阵营选择，而中国则利用市场与项目杠杆。在巴拿马法院取消CK Hutchison港口权利后，据报北京暂停了价值数十亿US dollars的新项目谈判，并加强了对香蕉和咖啡出口的海关审查；在秘鲁，2024年一座大型中国港口启用后，华盛顿推进了附近一项$1.5 billion的海军基地提案（按约 1 USD ≈ 0.92 EUR，约€1.38 billion）；在阿根廷，Javier Milei政府阻止或冻结了多个与中国相关的倡议，包括一个$8 billion（约€7.36 billion）的核能项目。
核心战略变量是基础设施控制：分析人士指出，全球约85%的资讯流量经由海底电缆传输，因此智利的电缆决策被视为国家安全转折点，而不仅是商业决策。然而，智利对中国的经济暴露程度异常高，因为中国购买了智利大部分铜和几乎全部樱桃出口，并在输电与配电领域占有重要地位；同时，美国做法被视为主要是强制性的「stick」，而可对冲的激励「carrot」有限。短期影响是Kast即将上任政府面临部分对齐压力，但由于贸易、能源与大宗商品依赖在结构上仍然很大，全面反中切割的空间受限。
On February 24, 2026, the US under President Donald Trump escalated pressure on Chile, ending Santiago’s long-standing balancing strategy between China (its top trading partner) and the US (its leading foreign investor). Days before a Miami summit of Latin American conservatives and about 2 weeks before José Antonio Kast’s March 11 inauguration, Washington imposed visa restrictions on 3 Chilean officials linked to a proposed Chile-Hong Kong subsea cable backed by Chinese firms, while warning Chile to tighten telecom investment screening or risk its US visa-waiver access.
The Chile move fits a wider regional pattern in which the US is forcing alignment choices while China uses market and project leverage. After Panama’s court canceled CK Hutchison port rights, Beijing reportedly paused talks on new projects worth billions of US dollars and increased customs scrutiny on banana and coffee exports; in Peru, after a major Chinese port opened in 2024, Washington advanced a nearby naval-base proposal of $1.5 billion (about €1.38 billion at roughly 1 USD ≈ 0.92 EUR); in Argentina, Javier Milei’s government blocked or froze multiple China-linked initiatives, including an $8 billion (about €7.36 billion) nuclear project.
The core strategic variable is infrastructure control: analysts cited that about 85% of global information traffic moves through subsea cables, so Chile’s cable decision is treated as a national-security pivot rather than only a commercial one. Yet Chile’s economic exposure to China is unusually high, as China buys most Chilean copper and nearly all cherry exports and has major positions in power transmission and distribution, while the US approach is seen as mostly coercive ('stick') with limited offsetting incentives ('carrot'). The near-term implication is partial alignment pressure on Kast’s incoming government, but with constrained room for a full anti-China break because trade, energy, and commodity dependencies remain structurally large.