按该联合会的数字，2026 年的风光新增可发电超过 400 gigawatt-hours，大致相当于为印尼、墨西哥或沙乌地阿拉伯供电；而在 2020 年之前的大多数年份，这几乎能覆盖所有新增需求。然而，中国去年使用的电网用电量约比 2019 年多 1/3；要满足 5% to 6% 的需求增长，将需要接近 600 gigawatt-hours，任何缺口都会由燃煤电厂补上，而燃煤电厂约占全球二氧化碳排放的近 1/6。潜在抵消包括：今年预计并网的 8 座核反应炉新增约 64 gigawatt-hours、长江降雨改善贡献约 100 gigawatt-hours、以及被忽视的小规模太阳能再增加约 100 gigawatt-hours；但文章主张，这些都需要多个有利结果同时发生。
若中国要在不依赖不太可信的抵消或大规模碳捕集的情况下于 2060 达到净零，燃煤发电量就需要每年下降约 150 gigawatt-hours；去年下降约 100 gigawatt-hours，而随著需求上升，要重复这种降幅会更难。文章指出，OECD 的用电量自 1985 年以来只增长 1.5%，但实际收入翻倍；这意味著若中国放缓到类似的需求增长，既定的可再生能源扩张就能消除煤电，但近期需求仍主要由工业部门驱动：去年电动车充电与资料中心分别上升 49% 和 17%，但金属、建材与化工新增约 50 terawatt-hours，而电动车加资料中心约为 70 terawatt-hours。文中将政策与效率视为决定性杠杆：2026 年的装机预计比 2025 年低约 1/4，且太阳能下降 1/3；若能达到 US 风光每 kilowatt 的输出，可将化石发电削减约 1/3；若能达到 EU 每 kilowatt-hour 的经济产出，可削减约 1/2；两者同时做到，则可把化石燃料从电网中完全移除。
China is often portrayed as a near-zero-carbon “electrostate” built on electric vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines, high-speed rail, and ultra-high-voltage grids, but forecasts for 2026 suggest older coal-heavy dynamics still dominate. The China Electricity Council projects more than 300 gigawatts of new clean generation in 2026 while electricity consumption rises 5% to 6%, a combination that creates a shortfall if demand growth outpaces the usable clean output added.
On the council’s numbers, the 2026 wind-and-solar build would generate over 400 gigawatt-hours, roughly comparable to powering Indonesia, Mexico, or Saudi Arabia, and in most years before 2020 would have covered essentially all incremental demand. However, China last year used about 1/3 more grid electricity than in 2019, and meeting 5% to 6% demand growth would require close to 600 gigawatt-hours, with any gap filled by coal plants that account for nearly 1/6 of global carbon dioxide emissions. Potential offsets include 8 nuclear reactors slated to connect this year adding about 64 gigawatt-hours, improved Yangtze rainfall contributing around 100 gigawatt-hours, and overlooked small-scale solar adding another roughly 100 gigawatt-hours, but the article argues these require multiple favorable outcomes at once.
For China to reach net-zero by 2060 without implausible offsets or widespread carbon capture, coal generation would need to fall by about 150 gigawatt-hours every year; it fell about 100 gigawatt-hours last year, and repeating that gets harder as demand rises. The article notes that OECD electricity use has grown only 1.5% since 1985 while real incomes doubled, implying that if China slowed to similar demand growth, the planned renewables buildout could eliminate coal, yet recent demand is still driven heavily by industrial sectors: EV charging and data centers rose 49% and 17% last year, but metals, building materials, and chemicals added about 50 terawatt-hours versus roughly 70 terawatt-hours from EVs plus data centers. Policy and efficiency are presented as decisive levers: 2026 installations are projected to be about 1/4 below 2025 levels with solar down 1/3, while matching US wind-and-solar output per kilowatt could cut fossil generation by about 1/3, matching EU economic output per kilowatt-hour could cut it by 1/2, and doing both could remove fossil fuels from the grid entirely.