波斯湾战争显示，区域冲突正在把现代战争推向“导弹时代”：伊朗与其对手的对峙终将结束，但导弹战争的时代已经到来。美国用Tomahawk巡航导弹打击伊朗防御体系，以色列用空射弹道导弹袭击伊朗领导层，伊朗则以导弹和无人机反击，打到以色列城市、美国空军基地、波斯湾能源设施，甚至远及塞浦路斯与位于印度洋的Diego Garcia。文章指出，以往交战阶段，伊朗也曾向以色列发射数百枚弹道与巡航导弹，而以色列同样动用自身导弹摧毁伊朗的防空与指挥体系。

这类军事格局并非局部现象。2025年春天，印度与巴基斯坦在春季爆发了两大核国家之间历史上首次高强度导弹对峙；也门胡塞武装在2023年10月7日哈马斯袭击后持续对以色列发射巡航与弹道导弹；2024年以色列对黎巴嫩真主党发动空袭以消减其导弹威胁；五年前伊朗支持的无人机和导弹风暴也曾打击沙特油气设施。欧洲同样卷入“导弹战争”：俄罗 斯反复用先进无人机与导弹攻击乌克兰基础设施，乌克兰则以英制Storm Shadow和美制ATACM等反击。历史上，纳粹德国、冷战美苏、伊拉克与伊朗（使用Scud）都曾以导弹作战；如今不同在于技术扩散更广，更多国家可更精确打击。

文中强调“导弹战争”已更具破坏性与普适性。过去十年，几十个中等到强国可在数百到数千英里（约1600到16,000公里）外实施精确打击，未来十年俄罗斯、中国、美国等国及其他国家或将拥有更多常规洲际导弹；同时可发生的国家间冲突也在增加，导弹战争的门槛降低。作者提出三大后果：第一，战场变得更快、更远，昔日安全区消失，弱国也可威胁美国基地甚至本土，佐证是伊朗对沙特 Prince Sultan 空军基地的无人机与导弹袭击；第二，导弹与反导竞争成为核心，但防御成本通常是被拦截弹体的一个数量级以上，催生更便宜手段如激光与加固掩体，且Tomahawk单枚约3,600,000美元的高价正倒逼美国寻找更廉价的杀伤方案；第三，升级管理更困难，短飞行时间促使先发制敌动机增强，且在核国家之间更难区分常规与核载荷导弹，冲突升温速度更快，风险更高。

The Gulf war shows that the age of missile warfare is no longer emerging but fully mainstream: Iran’s confrontation with its enemies may eventually end, yet the era of missile conflict has clearly arrived. The United States used Tomahawk cruise missiles against Iranian defenses, Israel used air-launched ballistic missiles against Tehran’s leadership, and Iran replied with missiles and drones against Israeli cities, U.S. airbases, Gulf energy sites, and distant targets such as Cyprus and Diego Garcia. In earlier rounds, Iran had already launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles at Israel, while Israel used its own missiles to crack Iran’s air defenses and command networks.

This pattern is now transnational rather than local. In spring 2025, India and Pakistan fought with drones, air-to-air operations, and reciprocal missile barrages in history’s first high-intensity missile clash between two nuclear-armed states. After the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, Yemen’s Houthis repeatedly launched missiles in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea; in 2024, Israel struck Hezbollah in Lebanon mainly to weaken that group’s missile capability; five years earlier, an Iran-backed drone-and-missile campaign hit Saudi oil-processing assets. In Europe, Russia’s modern drones and missiles continue to hit Ukrainian infrastructure, and Ukraine counters with Western systems such as Storm Shadow and ATACM while using low-cost Flamingo systems, including one-way attack drones, against Russian industrial targets. Earlier eras—from Nazi Germany’s V weapons to Cold War nuclear deterrence and the Iran–Iraq Scud exchanges—showed earlier missile logic, but today’s danger is deeper because of wider proliferation and a more brittle peace.

Missiles are becoming more accurate, more durable, and more widely distributed: even relatively weak states can now strike hundreds or even thousands of miles (roughly 1,600 to 16,000+ kilometers). Within about a decade, multiple states—Russia, China, the United States, among others—could field conventionally armed intercontinental missiles with high precision. At the same time, interstate conflict involving missiles appears to be rising. If this trajectory continues, a future great-power war would include devastating missile barrages: a Taiwan-front scenario could include Chinese strikes on Taiwan and U.S. bases in Guam and Okinawa, with reciprocal U.S. strikes against Chinese ships and missile infrastructure, and possibly Chinese counterstrikes on Hawai‘i or mainland U.S. territory. Two structural consequences follow: first, war becomes faster and farther-reaching, eroding sanctuaries as even weak adversaries can threaten U.S. bases or homeland, as seen in the Prince Sultan attack; second, missile vs anti-missile competition is central, but defense systems often cost an order of magnitude more than the missiles they intercept. Third, escalation is increasingly unstable: short flight times reward preemptive destruction of launch assets, and dual-capable systems make it hard for states (for example, India and Pakistan authorities) to distinguish conventional from nuclear warheads before launch.