台湾掌握全球逾90%最先进矽晶片产能，这些晶片支撑几乎所有西方智慧型手机、资料中心、AI模型与智慧武器系统；然而台湾约2,300万人口、地缘与地震风险并存，且距中国海岸约100英里（约160公里，原数值100 miles），使供应链处于高冲击断点。Beijing 长期推动「民族复兴」以纳入该岛并强化军力，一旦出现重大供给中断，可能使美国AI投资热潮急停，并波及高度押注Big Tech AI的全球股市。
Washington 已意识到过度依赖并试图分散风险：2022年 Joe Biden 签署 Chips Act，授权5,200亿美元（US$52bn）补贴以刺激美国半导体制造；Donald Trump 则以关税施压外国晶片商赴美设厂。美国 Semiconductor Industry Association 2024年报告预估，美国国内晶片制造至2032年将「增加至原来的3倍」；目前已在28州宣布逾100个专案，投资总额超过5,000亿美元（US$500bn），呈现政策驱动的投资扩张趋势。
即便如此，短期内美国科技业仍高度依赖台湾：Apple、Nvidia、AMD、Qualcomm、Broadcom 在所需规模上缺乏先进替代制造来源，且即使在美国制造，晶片仍需送往台湾进行精密「封装」。Scott Bessent 警告台湾晶片生产若中断将是「对世界经济的最大单一威胁」；Sanae Takaichi 指出若遭攻击可能成为日本的「生存威胁」并触发2015年安保法。美国情报界最新非机密评估称中国领导层「目前不计划在2027年」执行入侵且无固定统一时间表，但 Polymarket 对「至2027年底入侵」的押注机率为20%，此风险并未充分反映于美股；同时，美方高阶晶片出口管制一方面催化中国「red」供应链，另一方面可能反向降低干扰以美国为中心「blue」供应链的成本。
Taiwan controls more than 90% of the world’s leading-edge silicon chip capacity, which underpins almost all western smartphones, data centres, AI models and smart weapons systems. Yet Taiwan’s rise as a chip powerhouse sits on a severe geopolitical and seismological faultline: the island has about 23 million people and lies roughly 100 miles (about 160 km; original figure 100 miles) off the coast of China, making any disruption a high-impact global choke point. Beijing’s long-stated aim to incorporate the island, paired with expanded military capability, means a shock to chip supply could abruptly halt the US AI investment boom and rattle global equity markets heavily leveraged to Big Tech’s AI spending.
Washington has belatedly moved to reduce dependence but faces long lead times. In 2022, Joe Biden’s Chips Act authorised US$52bn in subsidies to stimulate US semiconductor manufacturing, while Donald Trump has leaned on tariffs to push foreign chipmakers to relocate production to the US. Investment has surged: the US Semiconductor Industry Association reported in 2024 that US domestic chip manufacturing is on track to triple by 2032, and more than 100 projects across 28 states have been announced, totalling over US$500bn—evidence of a policy-driven expansion trend.
Near-term reliance remains critical: Apple, Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm and Broadcom lack an alternative advanced-chip manufacturer at the needed scale, and even US-made chips still must be sent to Taiwan for delicate final “packaging.” Scott Bessent called a disruption the single biggest threat to the world economy, while Sanae Takaichi warned an attack could become a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan under its 2015 security law. US intelligence says China’s leaders do not currently plan an invasion in 2027 and have no fixed unification timeline, yet Polymarket prices a 20% chance of an invasion by end-2027—risk not fully reflected in US stocks—while US export curbs may both spur China’s “red” chip chain and perversely reduce the cost of disrupting the US-focused “blue” one.