2026年3月26日，6位民主党议员——参议员 Ron Wyden、Elizabeth Warren、Edward Markey 和 Alex Padilla，以及众议员 Pramila Jayapal 和 Sara Jacobs——致信国家情报总监 Tulsi Gabbard，询问使用商用 VPN 是否会使美国人丧失对无令状监控的宪法性限制。这些议员指出，包括 FBI、NSA 和 FTC 在内的机构曾公开鼓励公众使用 VPN，尽管 VPN 经常遮蔽使用者的真实位置；他们认为，若监测系统将某人视为外国人，该人可能失去与美国人身分相关的保障。
关注核心是《外国情报监控法》FISA 702 条款，该条款目前将于下个月到期，及更广泛的 EO 12333 计划。根据两者的已解密指引，除非有相反证据，预设认定位置不明的通讯来自非美国人。单一商用 VPN 伺服器可混合数千名使用者，让许多美国人看起来像是从同一个外国 IP 位址发出，例如阿姆斯特丹；在此规则下，针对外国人的大规模截取可能会把大量美国私人流量一并收入，且在 702 下 FBI 可能在无令状情况下检索这类资料。
信中也指出 EO 12333 的外部制衡更弱，仅由美国总检察长批准，并允许更大规模的外国通信监控。由于 VPN 流量可通过外国总部公司的海外伺服器转发，许多每年花费数十亿美元的消费者可能实际被推入将其当作外国人的系统。议员最后要求 Gabbard 厘清美国使用者可采取何种措施，才能在采用被宣传为隐私工具（包括部分由美国政府机构推广）的 VPN 时，仍保有宪法赋予的隐私权保护；文末补充说明于 2026年3月26日12:38 pm ET 更新。
On March 26, 2026, six Democratic lawmakers—Senators Ron Wyden, Elizabeth Warren, Edward Markey, and Alex Padilla, plus Representatives Pramila Jayapal and Sara Jacobs—sent a letter to DNI Tulsi Gabbard asking whether commercial VPN use can strip Americans of constitutional limits on warrantless surveillance. The lawmakers note that agencies have publicly encouraged VPN adoption, including the FBI, NSA, and FTC, despite VPNs often obscuring a user’s real location. They argue that if a person appears foreign to surveillance systems, they may lose protections normally tied to U.S. person status.
The concern focuses on FISA Section 702, currently due to expire next month, and the broader EO 12333 program. Under both authorities, declassified guidance allows a default presumption that communications of unknown location are from non-US persons unless there is evidence to the contrary. A single commercial VPN server can mix thousands of users, making many Americans appear to originate from the same foreign IP—an Amsterdam address, for example. Under these rules, bulk collection aimed at foreigners can sweep in massive U.S. private traffic; under Section 702, FBI analysts may search such data for Americans without warrants.
The letter also highlights EO 12333’s weaker external constraints, approved by the U.S. attorney general, and allowing large-scale foreign surveillance with fewer checks. Because VPN traffic can pass through servers owned by foreign-headquartered firms and overseas infrastructure, many consumers paying billions of dollars annually may effectively be routed into systems treating them as foreigners. Lawmakers ask Gabbard to clarify what, if anything, Americans can do to retain constitutionally protected privacy when using VPNs marketed as privacy tools, including those promoted by U.S. officials; the story was updated at 12:38 pm ET on March 26, 2026.