中国的杠杆具有可量化且结构性的来源：几乎全面主导稀土供应链，以及美国对近 700 种药物成分的依赖。稀土出口限制可外溢冲击电动车、卫星、航空与消费电子；分析人士指出，要用本土产能替代这种依赖需要多年。中国也证明能绕过美方晶片管制，透过走私与空壳买家取得处理器，同时华为等企业以「够用」的自研晶片维持竞争力。
在未来产业上，差距同样醒目：中国新增太阳能装机约为美国与欧洲合计的两倍，生产约 70% 的全球电动车，并展示可在 5 分钟内大幅充电的电池；2024 年中国新增工业机器人数量超过世界其他地区总和，DJI 约占商用无人机市场 70%。在军事面，中国自 2020 年以来核弹头库存已翻倍。不过长期逆风包括通缩、房市崩盘造成以「兆美元」计的财富蒸发，以及未来 25 年工作年龄人口可能下降约四分之一（~25%）。
US tariffs on China swung from 10% to 20% to 145% and back to 10%, yet the late‑October deal was marketed as a “massive victory” while largely restoring the prior status quo. Washington even reversed plans to expand export controls on more Chinese firms, a notable concession after months of escalation. The episode undercut claims that China held a “losing hand” and highlighted Beijing’s growing ability to make the US blink.
China’s leverage is quantitative and structural: near‑total dominance of rare‑earth supply chains and US dependence on ingredients in nearly 700 medicines. Export restrictions can ripple across EVs, satellites, aviation, and electronics; analysts say replacing this overreliance will take years. China has also shown it can route around US chip controls via smuggling and shell buyers, while firms like Huawei pursue “good‑enough” domestic chips to stay competitive.
On future industries, the gaps are stark: China is building about twice the solar capacity of the US and Europe combined, makes roughly 70% of the world’s EVs, and showcased five‑minute fast‑charging batteries; in 2024 it installed more factory robots than the rest of the world combined, and DJI sells about 70% of commercial drones. Militarily, it has doubled nuclear warheads since 2020. Yet long‑run headwinds include deflation, housing losses in the trillions, and a projected ~25% drop in working‑age adults over 25 years.
