在因其于 2022 年 2 月对乌克兰发动全面入侵而遭制裁之际，Russia 正在扩大其在 Africa 的影响力，相较于经济实力，更倚重文化、语言与宗教等管道。Kremlin 更广泛的外交诱因在于这个在 United Nations 拥有 54 票的洲，而 China 则以作为 Africa 最大贸易伙伴的身分主导硬实力层面的互动。在 South Africa，Robertson 附近的一处 Moscow Patriarchate 据点，呈现出 Russian Orthodox 扩张与定向外展的更大趋势，包括接触保守的 Afrikaans 社群与乡村的 Black 社群；在 2014 年并吞 Crimea 之后，与 West 的关系恶化，Moscow 试图在此背景下重建 Cold War 时代的联系。
Russia 已在 Africa 开设 7 个「Russian House」中心，并正就更多据点进行谈判；同时，俄语课程也被引入 Abidjan、Harare 等地的大学。2024 年，一个由 Putin 之女领导的基金会在 Dakar 开设了一间讲堂，以支援语言教学。Lavrov 表示，超过 32,000 名非洲学生正在 Russian 的大学就读，而提供给非洲人的奖学金名额自 2020 年以来几乎增加了 3 倍，达到超过 5,300 个名额。Russian Orthodox Church 在 Africa 的推进可由教会数据量化：不到 3 年内，其覆盖从 4 个非洲国家扩张至至少 34 个，神职人员增至 270 人，并截至 2024 年 6 月登记了 350 个堂区与社群；它以更高薪酬、更快晋升与培训管道（包括 2023 年一名 Madagascar 司铎为期 3 个月的实务实习）来吸引神职人员。
安全与人力投入与软实力并行：一份 European Parliament 报告称 Moscow 与 43 个非洲国家签有军事合作协议；尽管其在撒哈拉以南非洲的贸易伙伴中排名第 33，Russia 仍计划在 2026 年底前于 15 个非洲国家展开贸易使团。相较之下，EU 是 South Africa 最大投资者，约有 600 家 American 公司在当地营运。Russia 的 Africa 峰会吸引力不一：2019 年有 43 位国家元首出席，而 2023 年则为 17 位；国营媒体的扩张也包括在 2025 年初于 Ethiopia 设立一个非洲分社后，计划于 2026 年再设立第二个非洲分社。对 Ukraine 战争的招募在多项统计中被追踪：Ukraine 估计超过 1,400 名非洲人为 Russia 作战；Kenya 表示至少 200 名肯亚人被招募；一份报告称约从 35 个非洲国家进行招募，并点名约 300 名非洲人死亡；South African 当局正在调查一宗涉及约 20 名疑似招募对象的案件，另有一场审判预计于 2026 年 4 月开始。各国政府警告，工作与奖学金邀约可能掩盖军事目的，其他国家也提到与教会相关的影响力疑虑，其中包括 Czech 政府于 2023 年 4 月对 Patriarch Kirill 施加制裁。
Russia is expanding influence in Africa amid sanctions tied to its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leaning on cultural, linguistic, and religious channels more than economic power. The Kremlin’s broader diplomatic incentive is a continent that holds 54 votes at the United Nations, while China dominates hard-power engagement as Africa’s biggest trading partner. In South Africa, a Moscow Patriarchate outpost near Robertson illustrates a wider pattern of Russian Orthodox growth and targeted outreach, including conservative Afrikaans communities and rural Black communities, as Moscow tries to revive Cold War era ties after relations with the West deteriorated following Crimea’s 2014 annexation.
Russia has opened 7 “Russian House” centers in Africa and is negotiating additional sites, while Russian language programs are being introduced in universities such as in Abidjan and Harare; in 2024, a foundation led by Putin’s daughter opened a lecture hall in Dakar to support language instruction. Lavrov said more than 32,000 African students are studying at Russian universities, and scholarships for Africans have nearly tripled since 2020 to more than 5,300 places. The Russian Orthodox Church’s Africa push is quantified in church figures: in less than 3 years it expanded to at least 34 African countries from 4, grew clergy to 270, and registered 350 parishes and communities as of June 2024, using higher pay, faster promotion, and training pipelines (including a 3-month practical stint in 2023 for one Madagascan priest) to attract clergy.
Security and manpower efforts run alongside soft power: a European Parliament report said Moscow has military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries, and Russia plans trade missions in 15 African countries by the end of 2026 even though it ranks 33rd as a sub-Saharan Africa trade partner; by contrast, the EU is the biggest investor in South Africa and about 600 American companies operate there. Russia’s Africa summits show mixed traction, with 43 heads of state attending in 2019 versus 17 in 2023, while state media expansion includes a second African bureau planned for 2026 after one opened in Ethiopia in early 2025. Recruitment into the Ukraine war is tracked in multiple counts: Ukraine estimates more than 1,400 Africans are fighting for Russia; Kenya said at least 200 Kenyans were recruited; a report cited recruitment from about 35 African countries and named about 300 Africans killed; South African authorities are investigating a case involving about 20 alleged recruits and a separate trial scheduled to start in April 2026, as governments warn that job and scholarship offers can mask military aims and as other states cite church-linked influence concerns, including sanctions placed on Patriarch Kirill by the Czech government in April 2023.