该文章发表于 Feb 19, 2026，将美国草根组织描述为：在联邦高监控能力以及透过大型科技平台取得资料的情况下持续扩张，尤其是在涉及 DHS、ICE 和 CBP 的情境中。包括 Eva Galperin 与 Taylor Fairbank 在内的专家认为，组织者面临一种结构性的公开与保密取舍：运动需要公共可见性与广泛参与，但仍必须保护特定高风险资讯。核心方法是威胁建模，也就是群体明确划分哪些可以公开、哪些必须保密，然后采取相称的控制措施，而不是试图把所有内容都以同等强度保护。

在通讯方面，最强的预设建议是 Signal，因为它具备端对端加密、较低的中继资料保留与可用性；但专家强调操作纪律：启用自动消失讯息（从 4 weeks 到 30 seconds，对低敏感聊天建议 1 week）、使用 usernames 取代 phone numbers，并将超过 50 人的群组视为不适合敏感规划的非私密空间。装置安全被视为硬性依赖，包括 app lock、强密码、降低对生物辨识的依赖，以及在某些情况下使用独立的「alt phone」来做分舱式组织工作。对于团队协作，文中对比主流云端套件（Google Docs、Microsoft 365）与更重视隐私的路径，如 Proton、Matrix、Mattermost、Nextcloud、CryptPad，同时警告 Slack 与 Discord 属于中心化托管，对敏感内容是较差选择。

以证据为基础的保留意见是：没有任何工具是绝对的，信任边界既是社会性的也是技术性的，而最弱的端点可能暴露整个工作流程。成本与能力限制以案例量化：Proton 免费层级为 1 GB，付费方案为每月 $13 与 $20，且在 2021 曾有在法律压力下进行中继资料记录的先例；自架可降低第三方暴露，但需要接近全职的系统管理，而非临时维护。文章最后的含义是务实的风险治理：评估对手、资料类别与暴露路径（数位与线下），采用分层防护如 full-disk encryption、password managers 与 MFA，然后在仍有剩余风险下继续行动，因为组织工作本身就具有后果性。

Published on Feb 19, 2026, the article frames US grassroots organizing as expanding under high federal surveillance capacity and data access via major tech platforms, especially in contexts involving DHS, ICE, and CBP. Experts including Eva Galperin and Taylor Fairbank argue that organizers face a structural openness-versus-secrecy tradeoff: movements need public visibility and broad participation, but they must still protect specific high-risk information. The central method is threat modeling, meaning groups explicitly classify what can be public versus what must remain confidential, then apply proportionate controls instead of trying to secure everything equally.

For communications, the strongest default recommendation is Signal because of end-to-end encryption, low metadata retention, and usability, but experts stress operational discipline: enable disappearing messages (from 4 weeks down to 30 seconds, with 1 week suggested for lower-sensitivity chats), use usernames instead of phone numbers, and treat groups above 50 people as non-private for sensitive planning. Device security is presented as a hard dependency, including app lock, strong passcodes, reduced biometric reliance, and in some cases a separate “alt phone” for compartmentalized organizing. For team collaboration, the piece contrasts mainstream cloud suites (Google Docs, Microsoft 365) with more privacy-preserving paths such as Proton, Matrix, Mattermost, Nextcloud, and CryptPad, while warning that Slack and Discord are centrally hosted and poor choices for sensitive content.

The evidence-driven caveats are that no tool is absolute, trust boundaries are social as much as technical, and the weakest endpoint can expose the whole workflow. Cost and capability constraints are quantified in examples: Proton free tier at 1 GB, paid plans at $13 and $20 per month, and prior legal-pressure precedent in 2021 metadata logging; self-hosting can reduce third-party exposure but requires near full-time systems administration rather than ad hoc maintenance. The article’s final implication is pragmatic risk governance: assess adversaries, data classes, and exposure routes (digital and in-person), apply layered safeguards like full-disk encryption, password managers, and MFA, and then act despite residual risk because organizing itself is inherently consequential.