在津巴布韦首都哈拉雷富裕的 Highlands 地区，路边一块展示笑脸年轻中国家庭站在新建房屋前的广告牌，象征著中国买家购屋潮的上升。多家经纪人表示，优质地段的高端住宅需求正在增强，售价约为50万至200万美元不等，至少有两家中介聘请了普通话人员来服务新客户。经纪人称，许多买家以现金交易，能加快成交并拥有较强的谈判能力。与其他发展中国家许多中国移民通常是低薪劳工的叙事不同，在津巴布韦的中国新移民多数较为富裕。文中指出，当地较高识字率与工业基础使对低技能劳工需求较低，而国家以资源为主导的发展策略也吸引中国人才进入报酬较高的矿业与商业岗位。Steve Zhao 说，现在的中国居民已从旅客转为投资者；其在2月主持的春节活动吸引了约3万人。
报导将此现象置于更长的中津关系脉络中。20世纪70年代，北京支持 Robert Mugabe 的独立运动，并让其领导人接受毛泽东体系训练；Mugabe 后来以「向东看」政策偏向中国。近年，中国企业大量进入战略资产：文章称津巴布韦的锂产业供应全球需求约10%，且在其中占主导，同时中国资金也投向钢铁、铬矿、发电厂、银行、农业、哈拉雷机场扩建，乃至新国会大厦。哈拉雷仍保留殖民时代街名与制度痕迹，但在 Belgravia 的 San de Li 中心可见更直接的中国影响：中式饮食、杂货、与每天开到凌晨3点的赌场，里面大多由中国顾客主导。从中文菜单、中文路牌到10美元一份的菠萝蜜（jackfruit）等日常细节，显示出明显的文化转变。
在这些变化背后，哈拉雷核心公共服务仍脆弱：许多区域缺乏自来水，干道路灯失修，街道坑洞遍布。官员私下承认，中国投资已改变部分城市，尤其是房地产发展，且这一热潮与近五年的锂需求增长及黄金涨势相连。同期还出现政策要求转让股权给政治关系强的黑人民营业者、反复的债务压力，以及因25年前违约而长期被排除于国际债券市场之外。中国买家常以现金付款以绕过外汇管制和税务压力，并在高通膨与美元兑本币大幅波动下使按揭变得不吸引人、对银行信任度下降。虽然官方未公开按国籍统计，经纪人仍观察到房价以两位数增长，热门区域出售五间以上卧室、超过1英亩（约0.4公顷）土地以上的住宅，并配备私有太阳能与钻井供水；而于623英亩（约252公顷）的 Borrowdale Brooke，即使因新买家快速翻修与被认为违反社区规范而有摩擦，仲介仍普遍视其为对外资外流时代的一种净正向趋势。
On a billboard in affluent Highlands, Harare, a smiling young Chinese family in front of a new home symbolizes a strong rise in Chinese buyers. Brokers say demand for prime, upscale properties has intensified, with prices around $500,000 to $2 million. At least two agencies now hire Mandarin-speaking staff for these buyers. Agents report many pay in cash, enabling faster closings and stronger bargaining power. Unlike many Chinese migration stories elsewhere, where newcomers are often low-paid laborers, many arrivals here are relatively wealthy. The article links this to Zimbabwe’s higher literacy and industrial base, reducing low-skill labor demand, and to state-led resource policies that place Chinese workers in higher-paid mining and business roles. Steve Zhao says the Chinese presence has shifted from tourists to investors, and a February Chinese New Year event drew about 30,000 attendees.
The story frames this as part of a broader China-Zimbabwe relationship. In the 1970s, Beijing backed Robert Mugabe’s liberation movement and trained its leaders in Maoist methods; Mugabe later adopted a “Look East” policy favoring China. In recent years Chinese firms have moved into strategic sectors: Zimbabwe’s lithium industry, said to provide about 10% of global demand, is heavily Chinese-led, and Chinese-backed firms also invested in steel and chrome, power plants, banks, agriculture, Harare airport expansion, and the new parliament building. Harare still bears colonial street names and institutions, yet Chinese influence is visible in Belgravia’s San de Li center, which includes Chinese restaurants, a grocery, and a casino open until 3 a.m. populated mostly by Chinese customers. Everyday markers—Mandarin menus, Chinese signs, and $10 jackfruit packs—signal a clear cultural shift.
Beneath this is a fragile public-service backdrop: many parts of Harare lack running water, major roads have broken lights, and streets are full of potholes. Officials privately concede that Chinese investment has changed parts of the city, especially property development, and that this push links to five years of strong lithium demand and a gold rally. The period has also included Black ownership transfer policies, recurring debt stress, and exclusion from international debt markets after a default about 25 years ago. Chinese buyers commonly use cash partly to avoid strict exchange controls and taxes; with high inflation and local currency volatility, mortgages are unattractive and trust in banks is weak. Without nationality-based data, brokers still report double-digit house-price growth, including five-bedroom homes on plots above one acre with private utilities (solar and boreholes). In Borrowdale Brooke (623 acres, about 252 hectares), disputes include rapid renovations and perceived breaches of communal rules, yet brokers still view the trend as net-positive as capital is being invested locally rather than withdrawn.