到2001年，中国GDP已达美国的13%，美方顾问已把中国崛起视为威胁，却转而投入阿富汗与伊拉克。文中称两场「永久战争」总成本约3兆美元并消耗了约十年；在此期间中国迅速缩小差距，到小布希第二任期末，中国GDP约达美国的32%。作者将此归因于美国的战略分心，而非对中接触本身。
作者建议美国「学中国打长期战」：把重心放回国内的产业、教育、科技投资与财政可持续，并以灵活的短期交易降温竞争、避免升级。关键数据警讯在研发：依美国国科会（NSF），2012至2022年联邦政府在全国研发资金中的占比由28%降至18%；同时中国去年的研发支出仅比美国少约400亿美元。结论是必须加大投入、吸引人才，并避免新的对外政权更迭式冒险。
The essay argues the US misread four decades of China’s strategy: economic reform was used to entrench one‑party rule and expand influence, not liberalize. In the early 1990s this looked low‑risk because China’s 1992 nominal GDP was only 6.5% of US GDP, so US leaders discounted Deng’s explicit warnings after June 1989 and his goal of building a “new” order opposed to US dominance.
By 2001, China’s GDP had risen to 13% of the US, and the Bush team saw the threat—yet pursued Iraq and Afghanistan instead. Those “forever wars” are put at roughly $3 trillion and consumed a decade, while China closed the gap; by the end of Bush’s second term, mainland GDP reached about 32% of America’s. The author frames this as US distraction, not engagement, powering the shift.
The proposed fix is a long‑game “America First” focused on domestic capacity: industry, education, science and fiscal stability, paired with flexible deals to prevent escalation. A key numeric warning is R&D: NSF data show the federal share of US R&D funding fell from 28% to 18% between 2012 and 2022, even as China’s R&D spend was only $40 billion less than the US last year. The US should invest more, attract talent, and avoid new regime‑change adventures.
