2025年12月，美国以一份 6 页改革文件攻击最惠国原则，声称其妨碍提升福利的自由化；作者则认为这并非善意改革，而是要拆解多边规则体系。文中指出，WTO 规则本已容许优惠贸易协定作为例外，因此不同发展阶段与对中国补贴出口的疑虑，并不足以推翻最惠国原则。若较小经济体接受此逻辑，只会让强权把临时性、歧视性的双边安排合法化；相关例子包括历时 8 年的 EU-Australia 谈判，以及 SoftBank 在一项美日安排中预计收取 60 亿美元费用。
作者对 EU 的配合尤其失望。继 2024 年 Abu Dhabi 部长会议后，Maroš Šefčovič 于 2026 年 1 月也暗示最惠国并非不可触碰；作者认为这重演了争端解决机制的失败经验。2019 年美国拒绝任命 Appellate Body 新法官后，EU 曾提出加速裁决、限缩权限等调整，但毫无效果，机制至今仍遭冻结。核心判断是，美国对 WTO 不再有维系意愿；若其他成员仍假设华盛顿是在诚信改革，只会进一步削弱这个本已不稳的组织。
The article argues that the WTO faces a bleak ministerial meeting in Yaounde, Cameroon, not only because the Gulf conflict has intensified pressure on energy, fertiliser, and food, but also because the meeting itself looks dysfunctional. Logistical problems include overbooked hotels and poor internet access, and Taiwan withdrew after the hosts labelled it a province of China. The author stresses that the deeper problem is institutional: the claim relied on by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, that a clear majority of world goods trade still runs on most-favoured-nation terms, is now under direct attack from the United States.
In December 2025, the US attacked MFN with a six-page reform paper, arguing that the principle blocks welfare-enhancing liberalisation; the author says this is not reform in good faith but an attempt to dismantle the multilateral rules-based system. The piece notes that WTO rules already allow preferential trade agreements as an exception, so differences in development levels and concerns about China’s subsidised exports do not justify abandoning MFN. If smaller economies accept that logic, they would merely legitimise discriminatory, improvised bilateral deals by larger powers; examples around the article include the 8-year EU-Australia negotiations and a planned $6 billion fee for SoftBank in a US-Japan arrangement.
The author is especially critical of the EU for accommodating this shift. After the 2024 Abu Dhabi ministerial, Maros Sefcovic suggested in January 2026 that MFN was not untouchable, which the author sees as repeating the failed dispute-settlement episode. Since the US refused in 2019 to appoint a new Appellate Body judge, the EU has offered procedural concessions such as faster rulings and narrower scope, yet the system remains frozen. The central judgment is that the US no longer wants to sustain the WTO; if other members keep assuming Washington is reforming in good faith, they will help weaken an already fragile institution.