2026年的新闻可能让人误认为冲突已见顶，但Donald Trump的关税战已接近其宪法与制度边界；按其效果看，其影响并未奏效。到2025年，征税措施等效于美国GDP的1%，且主要由美国企业和选民承担，64%的美国民众表示不支持。若各国不重演1930年代那种全面报复，Donald Trump或其继任者若放缓，关税升级会迅速降温；然而“经济民族主义”并未因此结束。

单看货物贸易会产生偏差。2024年，全球货物进出口总量达到49万亿美元，约占全球GDP的45%，并且关税成本可直接量化。在美国，决策者是行政部门或国会；在中国，则由Xi Jinping主导。然而更隐蔽的跨境流动规模同样巨大：2024年服务、数据、知识资本、投资和支付流达48万亿美元，若计入跨国公司境外子公司本地销售则超过60万亿美元。许多环节的直接收入不高，但在金融和技术网络中的作用却可能更关键，因此这类活动比传统关税更难以直接控制。

各国政府正在通过产业政策、制裁、投资管制、监管偏向和强化民族主义等分散机制来重塑全球连接，这些机制更不透明且难以回溯，但在安全与选民压力下很受欢迎。欧洲、德国Rheinmetall和印度都在体现这种转向：欧洲在规划数字货币，德国国防企业Rheinmetall预计2030年营收将是目前的5倍，印度刚宣布在境内“算力”建设上有2100亿美元私人投资。企业正在重组供应链与组织结构以保留利润并规避成本，投资者也可能看到资产价格、利率和风险溢价偏离过去三十年的收敛格局；美国进入2028年后可能换届，但企业按国籍区分、国家利益优先于全球利益的做法大概率延续，这正是新阶段经济民族主义的核心。

The 2026 headlines may suggest the conflict has peaked, but Donald Trump’s tariff campaign has reached the edge of its constitutional and political limits and has not worked as intended. By 2025, the duties were equivalent to 1% of US GDP and were largely shifted to US firms and voters, with 64% of Americans opposing it. If countries avoid a full 1930s-style retaliation cycle, a pause by Donald Trump or his successor would likely cool the trade escalation quickly; yet economic nationalism has not ended.

Focusing only on goods trade is misleading. In 2024, global goods imports and exports reached $49tn, about 45% of world GDP, with effects that are relatively easy to measure. In the US, decisions are made by the administration or Congress; in China, by Xi Jinping. But less visible cross-border flows are also enormous: services, data, intellectual capital, investment, and payment flows totalled $48tn in 2024, and above $60tn if foreign sales by multinationals’ local subsidiaries are included. Even when direct revenues are lower, these channels can be systemically more important, so this second layer of globalization is harder to regulate through traditional tariffs alone.

Governments are now reshaping global linkages through industrial policy, sanctions, investment controls, regulatory bias, and stronger nationalist norms—diffuse tools that are less transparent and harder to reverse but politically attractive in a security-and-voter environment. Europe, Germany’s Rheinmetall, and India all signal this shift: Europe is pursuing a digital currency, Rheinmetall projects revenues 5x larger by 2030, and India recently announced $210bn in domestic compute-investment commitments. Firms are reorganizing supply chains and structures to preserve profit and avoid costs, while investors may see asset prices, interest rates, and risk premia diverging after three decades of convergence; even if US leadership changes after 2028, nationality-based differentiation and “country first, world second” policy likely remain the norm.