从1300到1800年，英格兰/英国几乎有一半时间处于衰退；19世纪仅有四分之一，20世纪进一步下降。最近衰退罕见。尽管面临冲击，2022–24年全球实际GDP年均增长3%，今年预计再增3%；2025年第三季度全球企业利润同比增长11%；经合组织失业率接近历史低点；除新冠外，超过15年没有同步全球衰退；约三分之一的美国工人从未经历过长期衰退。
一些衰退会激发“创造性毁灭”——Caballero与Hammour（1994）及后续研究发现衰退时期创办的初创企业表现更好。2020年欧洲保护就业（失业率峰值8.6%），而美国放任就业下降（15%），并在2020–22年看到劳动力重新配置增加了两倍；自2019年以来美国劳动生产率增长10%，而欧盟仅增长2%。但过去的衰退（1990年代日本；2007–09年）显示衰退也可能使低生产率固化。
稳定带来三类日益增长的风险。金融：家庭近年向全球股市配置约3万亿美元，且30%的美国家庭资产面临股市风险——修正将造成痛苦。财政：富裕国家公共债务处于拿破仑战争以来的高位；美国或有或有负债超过130万亿美元（约为GDP的5倍），且赤字超过GDP的5%；各国在2022年对能源的救助约占GDP的3%。配置层面：上市“僵尸”公司比例从2000年的6%上升到2021年的9%，降低了健康企业进入率、职工调岗和生产率。政策制定者必须在避免衰退与允许企业与岗位更替之间取得平衡，否则将堆积金融、财政和配置脆弱性。
From 1300–1800 England/Britain were in recession almost half the time; in the 19th century only a quarter, falling further in the 20th. Recently recessions are rare. Despite shocks 2022–24 global real GDP grew 3% a year on average and looks set for another 3% this year; Q3 2025 global corporate profits rose 11% year-on-year; OECD unemployment near historical lows; no synchronised global recession for over 15 years; about one-third of US workers have never experienced a prolonged downturn.
Some recessions spur 'creative destruction'—Caballero & Hammour (1994) and later studies find recession-born startups outperform. In 2020 Europe protected jobs (unemployment peaked 8.6%) while the US let jobs fall (15%) and saw labour reallocation rise twice as much in 2020–22; since 2019 US labour productivity is up 10% versus 2% in the EU. But past downturns (Japan 1990s; 2007–09) show recessions can instead lock in low productivity.
Stability breeds three growing risks. Financial: households invested about $3trn into global equities recently and 30% of US household assets are stock-exposed—corrections would hurt. Fiscal: rich-world public debt is at post-Napoleonic highs; US contingent liabilities exceed $130trn (~5× GDP) and the US deficit exceeds 5% of GDP; governments also spent about 3% of GDP in Europe in 2022 on energy support. Allocative: listed 'zombie' firms rose from 6% (2000) to 9% (2021), reducing healthy entry, job-to-job moves and productivity. Policymakers must balance avoiding downturns with allowing turnover or risk mounting financial, fiscal and allocative fragilities.