沙特与阿联酋的两条绕行通道合计可提供约650万至700万桶/日（约1.0到1.1万立方米/日）的临时替代。当前约25艘超大型油轮（每艘约可装载200万桶，即约3.18万立方米）已改道前往新的装载点，港口是否能承接如此规模仍待验证。伊朗首轮打击后，市场开盘时油价在几秒内突破100美元/桶并快速拉升约20%。作者认为，管线绕行可“买时间”、放缓涨幅，但不足以根本改变局势；要使特朗普的战略成立，他必须在“几天”内压低战事，或至少在短期内恢复部分霍尔木兹通行，并依赖地区油田、炼厂和装船设施在短期内不遭破坏。
周日，state-owned Saudi Aramco 在Yanbu与Al Muajjiz两处红海终端同时装载3艘VLCC，Abu Dhabi的Adnoc在Fujairah又装载1艘VLCC，体现前所未有的改道规模。尽管如此，按通胀调整后，当前油价仍低于2008年7月的147.50美元（现值约205美元）和2022年3月的139美元（现值约157美元）；此前冲击在时间上主要是“按天”而非“按月或按季”。但若战争从“几天”变成“几周”，并使价格在更高位持续，才可能触发真正危机。与此同时，沙特和阿联酋在保障供应与安全间承担更高风险：随着油轮外移，业界担忧管线、泵站乃至港口遭伊朗无人机袭击；他们既想维持供给，也可能因事实上的安全承诺而被卷入更深的冲突，情境被比喻为“pipeline battle”。
Iran’s war strategy with the U.S. and Israel is now clear: create economically unbearable pressure on Donald Trump by driving U.S. gasoline prices higher, forcing him to abandon what he called a “war of choice.” Whether it fails depends heavily on whether Saudi Arabia can cushion oil markets. The article highlights the 1,200-kilometer (746-mile) East-West pipeline across the Arabian Peninsula, built 45 years ago for the same scenario: a potential Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The strait carries about 20 million barrels per day, roughly one-fifth of global consumption. The Saudi line cannot replace that fully but can reroute up to 5 million barrels per day (about 0.80 million m³/day), while the U.S.-sponsored United Arab Emirates line to the Gulf of Oman carries about 1.5 million barrels per day (about 0.24 million m³/day), possibly near 2 million (about 0.32 million m³/day) in an emergency.
Together, the two Saudi-UAE bypasses could provide roughly 6.5 to 7 million barrels per day (about 1.0 to 1.1 million m³/day) of temporary relief. About 25 supertankers, each holding around 2 million barrels (about 0.32 million m³), have already diverted to new loading points, and port throughput remains uncertain. After Iran’s first attacks, oil prices jumped above $100 per barrel within seconds and rose about 20% immediately. The author argues the bypasses can buy time and slow further increases, but they do not solve the core problem. For Trump to succeed, he would need the conflict ended in days rather than weeks, or at least enough tanker movement through Hormuz within that window to avoid sustained market panic.
On Sunday, state-owned Saudi Aramco loaded three VLCCs at Yanbu and Al Muajjiz on the Red Sea, while Abu Dhabi’s Adnoc loaded another at Fujairah, signaling unprecedented diversion scale. Yet the spike remains limited in comparison with adjusted historical peaks: 2008’s $147.50/bbl (about $205 in today’s terms) and 2022’s $139/bbl (about $157 today). So far the rise is measured in days rather than months or quarters. If bombardment and counterattacks shift from days to weeks, and prices stay high, a full crisis can emerge. There is also a strategic cost: Saudi Arabia and the UAE now walk a security tightrope as oil is rerouted, with worries that pipelines, pump stations, or ports could face Iranian drone attacks. Their stabilizing role helps Washington but may deepen their own risk, making the conflict resemble a “Battle of the Pipelines.”