缅甸与委内瑞拉被并置，核心在于权力合法性、资源禀赋与大国博弈的相似结构。委内瑞拉总统马杜罗在2024年选举中获得“第三任期”，但选举被指存在舞弊；缅甸军方领导人敏昂莱则在2021年政变后推动分阶段选举，投票日期为2024年12月28日、2025年1月11日和1月25日，结果预计月底公布，几乎确定由亲军方政党大胜。两国反对派象征人物分别是玛丽亚·科里纳·马查多与昂山素季，均为女性民主领袖与诺贝尔和平奖得主。

两国同为资源富集且战略敏感：委内瑞拉拥有全球最大的原油储量，缅甸稀土产量居全球第三，且稀土矿全部出口至中国。中国约占全球70%的稀土产量，并将出口管制作为地缘政治工具。缅甸还拥有关键基础设施：若开邦皎漂深水港及两条各长870公里的油气管道，将中东和非洲原油、孟加拉湾天然气直接输送至中国云南，绕开马六甲海峡这一战略瓶颈。

中国在缅甸采取“分而治之”的双轨策略。一方面在联合国等场合支持军政府，推动选举以提供制度连续性与法律确定性；另一方面保持对边境武装的影响力。2023年10月，“1027行动”爆发，缅甸民族民主同盟军、德昂民族解放军与若开军发动进攻，2024年8月攻占掸邦腊戍，首次击落全国14个军区司令部之一。随后中国调停，2025年4月腊戍归还军方。分析认为，这种做法并非民主化，而是将国家碎片化制度化，以降低中国自身风险，使选后缅甸更趋向“为中国而存在”的政体。

Myanmar and Venezuela are juxtaposed for their shared patterns of contested legitimacy, resource endowments, and great-power maneuvering. Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro secured a “third term” in the 2024 election amid fraud allegations, while Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing advanced a phased vote held on Dec. 28, Jan. 11, and Jan. 25, with results due by month’s end and a pro-military landslide expected. Both countries’ main opposition figures—Maria Corina Machado and Aung San Suu Kyi—are female pro-democracy leaders and Nobel Peace Prize laureates.

Both states are resource-rich and strategically prized. Venezuela holds the world’s largest crude oil reserves, while Myanmar ranks third globally in rare-earth output, all of which is exported to China. China accounts for roughly 70% of global rare-earth production and has used export controls as leverage. Myanmar also anchors critical infrastructure for China: the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port and two 870-kilometer oil and gas pipelines carrying Middle Eastern and African crude and Bay of Bengal gas to Yunnan, bypassing the Malacca Strait chokepoint.

China’s approach in Myanmar reflects a divide-and-rule, dual-track strategy. Beijing backs the junta diplomatically and supports elections to provide continuity and legal assurance, while retaining leverage over border armed groups. In October 2023, Operation 1027 saw coordinated offensives by the MNDAA, TNLA, and AA; by August 2024 they captured Lashio, toppling one of the country’s 14 regional commands. China then mediated a reversal, returning Lashio to the military in April 2025. Analysts argue this is not democratization but institutionalized fragmentation to reduce China’s risk, shaping a post-election Myanmar increasingly aligned with Beijing’s interests.