亚洲在2025年主要被三股力量塑造：特朗普与习近平的「兄弟情」、对台湾日增的压力，以及更为自信的金正恩与莫斯科、北京走近。文中预测这些动态在2026年会更强化，使区域更动荡，但不代表战争迫在眉睫。

尽管市场欢迎，文中称「特朗普—习」的回暖很脆弱：中国被描绘为2025年贸易战的赢家，使特朗普处于不利位置。两人2026年可能最多会面四次，带来反复的摩擦点。MERICS的一项调查显示，接近四分之三的中国观察者预期关系全面恶化——军事、贸易与科技皆然。文章亦提到美国允许英伟达向中国出售先进晶片，但最顶级产品仍受限制，等于让北京至少取得领先一代的供应。

在台湾方面，赖清德面对国会僵局，仍要推动400亿美元的追加国防预算；台北也计划到2030年把国防支出提高到GDP的5%，由目前略高于3%上调。文中引述美方情报称习近平希望解放军到2027年具备入侵能力，但不少分析更认为封锁或「隔离」情境较可能。朝鲜半岛方面，美国国防情报局2025年简报称北韩已具备可打到美国本土的洲际弹道飞弹；谈判自2019年破裂后停滞，但对2026年峰会的猜测可能增加金正恩的筹码。

Written on Dec. 31, 2025, the column argues that Asia’s 2025 was shaped by three forces: a Trump–Xi “bromance,” rising pressure on Taiwan, and a more emboldened Kim Jong Un drawing closer to Moscow and Beijing. It forecasts these same dynamics intensifying in 2026, raising regional volatility without implying war is imminent.

Despite market optimism, the Trump–Xi thaw is described as fragile: China is portrayed as the 2025 trade-war winner, leaving Trump “on the back foot.” They could meet as many as four times in 2026, creating repeated flashpoints. A MERICS survey finds almost three-quarters of China watchers expect broad deterioration—military, trade, and technology. The piece also notes the US letting Nvidia sell advanced chips to China, though top products remain restricted, effectively giving Beijing access at least a generation ahead.

On Taiwan, President Lai faces a gridlocked legislature while seeking a $40 billion supplemental defense budget; Taipei also aims to lift defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2030 from just over 3%. US intelligence is cited saying Xi wants the PLA capable of invasion by 2027, though analysts see blockade or quarantine scenarios as likelier. On Korea, a 2025 DIA briefing says North Korea has an ICBM that can reach the continental US; talks have been stalled since 2019, yet 2026 summit speculation could boost Kim’s leverage.