到2025年底，日中关系以更尖锐的方式回到“战略疑虑叠加经济相互依存”的老格局，台湾仍是触发点。日本首相高市早苗在11月的一句涉台表述引爆多战线争端；仅6周后，北京已多次要求撤回。东京的止损做法是回到1972年《日中联合声明》的既定表述——承认中华人民共和国为中国唯一合法政府，并称“充分理解并尊重”北京对台湾的立场——同时拒绝把任何“台海有事”的行动细节说死。

北京迅速把争议推向联合国体系，意在把关于主权、干预与安全角色的“正常表述”写入全球外交记录。这次快速“压力测试”同时追求多重效果：迫使日本回到公式化克制，通过旅游与商业预期施压来警示第三方，试探美日同盟的反应与口径，并在2025年“战后80周年”的记忆政治氛围中把日本防务改革重新包装为“再军事化”。与此同时，解放军（以及俄军）在日本西南诸岛周边的行动更频繁、更常态化。

操作层面的风险正在上升：12月上旬，日本称中国航母舰载机在冲绳附近对其战机实施雷达照射；中方则指责日机干扰——体现出拦截距离更近、节奏更快、事故与误判空间更大。美国新发布的《2025年国家安全战略》强调西半球优先与更紧的升级控制，意味着对台湾更不愿出现“自动牵连”的承诺。到2026年，各方激励更指向高摩擦但可控：日本在刺激政策与债券/收益率/日元压力下避免广泛经济报复；中国在推进2035愿景与第十五个五年规划中兼顾对台立场与稳定；台湾内政可能放大时间表与加码军购承诺——使危机沟通与冲突预防机制更显迫切。

By late 2025, Japan-China ties end in a sharper version of “suspicion + interdependence,” with Taiwan as the trip wire. A single phrase from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in November triggered a multi-arena dispute; just six weeks later Beijing was repeatedly demanding a retraction. Tokyo’s damage control leans on the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué—recognizing the PRC and “understanding and respecting” its Taiwan position—while refusing to spell out contingency operations.

China quickly internationalized the argument at the U.N., aiming to set “normal” diplomatic language on sovereignty and intervention. Beijing’s rapid stress test sought several effects at once: push Japan back to formulaic restraint, warn third countries via tourism/business pressure, probe U.S.-Japan messaging, and frame Japan’s defense reforms as “remilitarization” during the 80th-anniversary memory politics of 2025. Meanwhile PLA (and Russian) activity near Japan’s southwest islands is becoming more frequent and normalized.

Operational risk is rising: in early December Japan said Chinese carrier aircraft radar-targeted its fighters near Okinawa, while China blamed Japanese interference—an illustration of closer intercepts and higher tempo. The U.S. 2025 National Security Strategy signals a re-weighting toward the Western Hemisphere and tighter escalation control, implying fewer “automatic” Taiwan commitments. In 2026, incentives on all sides point to high-friction management: Japan avoids broad economic retaliation amid stimulus and bond/yield/yen worries; China balances resolve with stability toward its 2035 vision and 15th Five-Year Plan; Taiwan’s politics can amplify timelines and arms-buy promises—making conflict-prevention mechanisms urgent.