中国将GDP增长目标下调至4.5%—5.0%被描述为适度调整，但文章认为这是政治性选择，关联到北京到2035年超过美国的目标。经过多年过度投资后，中国已将滞销产能外销：本世纪出口价格几乎下降20%，而出口量却上升约40%。贸易顺差同比增长20%，创下1.2万亿美元新高，净出口为2025年增长贡献近三分之一，这使其全球贸易顺差占比异常之大。该“倾销驱动”模式使泰国和印度尼西亚的工厂停产，并在中国进口增长最快的国家伴随就业增速放缓。
全球前70大经济体中有50多个采取了反倾销防御，法国和德国甚至直接向习近平提出投诉；但2025年新的贸易壁垒放慢，因为许多国家将注意力放在美国关税冲击上。作者在欧洲、中东和亚洲采访中记录到，政策制定者称自己无法打一场两线作战，因此优先应对特朗普贸易行动的短期波动。中国的处境更难：在二战后成为发达国家的近40个经济体中，没有一个同时经历人口减少与高债务，而且主要经济体在人口萎缩下维持高于2%的增长非常少见。中国债务率约为GDP的340%，远高于同类经济体。
若要实现目标，中国需要高生产率增长，但本十年总要素生产率增长接近于零，意味着扩张主要靠更多投资。根据类似“会议委员会”的估计，当前需要约6美元新增债务才能带来1美元GDP增长，而20年前仅需1美元。人工智能及其他技术不太可能恢复接近5%的增长趋势，潜在增速更可能在2%至3%之间。消费每年增长约5%，并非很弱，但家庭因债务和房产损失而提高储蓄。投资仍快于消费，推动年出口达3.8万亿美元，现已高于美国进口，差距仍在扩大。
China’s cut of its GDP target to 4.5–5.0% is presented as modest, yet the article treats it as political, tied to Beijing’s goal of overtaking the U.S. by 2035. After years of overinvestment, China has exported unsold output: export prices fell nearly 20% this decade while volume rose about 40%. The trade surplus increased 20% to a US$1.2tn record, and net exports contributed nearly one-third of 2025 growth, making China’s share of global trade surplus unusually large. The dumping model has idled factories in Thailand and Indonesia and coincides with weaker job gains where Chinese import growth is highest.
More than 50 of the world’s 70 biggest economies adopted anti-dumping defenses; France and Germany even complained directly to Xi Jinping. Yet protections slowed in 2025 as many countries focused on U.S. tariff shocks. In interviews across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, policymakers said they cannot fight a two-front trade war, so they prioritize the volatile threat from Trump trade actions. China’s case is tougher: among nearly 40 economies that became developed after WWII, none had both depopulation and high debt, and major economies rarely sustain growth above 2% with a shrinking workforce. China’s debt is about 340% of GDP, far above peers.
To meet its target, China needs strong productivity gains, but total-factor productivity growth has been near zero this decade, implying expansion is mainly via more investment. Conference Board-type estimates show that it now takes about $6 of new debt to generate $1 of GDP growth, versus $1 two decades ago. AI and other technologies are unlikely to restore near-5% trend growth, and potential growth is probably 2%–3%. Consumption has grown about 5% a year and is not weak, but households are saving more due to debt and property losses. Investment still outpaces consumption, pushing annual exports to US$3.8tn, now above U.S. imports, with the gap widening.