在大约 4 周内，伊朗政府在全国性动荡期间关闭了与全球互联网的大多数连线；据报导，武装力量杀害了数千名反政权抗议者。此举为 15 年以上不断收紧的数位管控画下句点，包括过滤、「数位宵禁」以及此前的断网。2026 年 2 月 9 日的报告将自 2026 年 1 月 8 日开始的断网描述为一次重大升级，属于德黑兰长期透过技术与法律手段控制连线的工程，其中包括名为 National Information Network（NIN）的内部内联网，旨在在限制外来与外泄资讯的同时，让国内服务持续运作。
研究人员表示，自 2019 年一次造成经济冲击的断网以来，伊朗一直在完善其操作手册，使其能在保留国家控制的内部网路的同时，进行选择性限速与下架；然而，2026 年 1 月的行动看起来异常粗暴：它似乎在数天内连 NIN 本身也被停用，干扰政府网站与国内服务，并有报告称停电影响到市话，甚至影响到具特权存取的 SIM 卡。外部监测描述连线图表与流量呈现混乱且「零星」的状态，分析人士也指出一个矛盾：近乎全面的断网会降低国家原本可用于监控的线上活动。同时，美国非营利组织 Holistic Resilience 于周一发布的新报告描述了一个高度集中化的监控生态系，称 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 被描述为几乎所有电信系统的股东或共同所有者，使其能存取几乎任何经由 NIN 传输的资料，包括通讯内容。
随著部分连线逐步恢复，观察者表示伊朗似乎正转向「白名单」模式，把上网变成分区、需许可的服务：关键商业与国家功能可运作，而大部分民众仍与全球网路隔绝；在 1 月中旬左右，国家媒体公布了一份可在 NIN 上使用的网站清单（例如国内搜寻、地图、影音与讯息服务）。所描述的更大趋势，是朝向无所不在监控的「终局」前进：整合式 CCTV、人脸辨识、讯息撷取应用程式与用于「生活方式监控」的建档系统，并搭配一种孤立主义的网路设计，可封锁入站与出站连线。分析人士提醒，外部讯号尚无法确认这种波动是刻意为之或系统故障，但警告该事件可能加速永久性断连或与全球互联网的碎片化分离；同时也指出一个实际上限：完全断连可能适得其反，因为当人们无法在家得知正在发生什么时，可能会有更多人走上街头。
Over roughly 4 weeks, Iran’s government shut down most connections to the global internet amid nationwide unrest in which forces reportedly killed thousands of anti-regime protesters, capping more than 15 years of tightening digital controls such as filtering, “digital curfews,” and prior blackouts. The February 9, 2026 report frames the shutdown that began on January 8, 2026 as a major escalation in Tehran’s long-running project to control connectivity through technical and legal means, including an internal intranet called the National Information Network (NIN) intended to keep domestic services running while limiting what information comes in and what can get out.
Researchers say Iran has been refining its playbook since an economically disruptive shutdown in 2019 to enable selective throttling and takedowns while preserving state-controlled internal networks, yet the January 2026 action appeared unusually blunt: it seemingly disabled the NIN itself for multiple days, disrupting government websites and domestic services, with reports of outages affecting landlines and even privileged-access SIMs. External monitoring described connectivity graphs and traffic as chaotic and “spotty,” and analysts noted the paradox that near-total blackouts reduce the very online activity a state would otherwise surveil. At the same time, new reports released on Monday by the US-based nonprofit Holistic Resilience describe a highly centralized surveillance ecosystem in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is described as a shareholder or part owner of almost all telecom systems, enabling access to virtually any data transiting the NIN, including communications.
As some connectivity partially returned, observers said Iran appeared to be moving toward “whitelisting,” turning internet access into a segmented, permissioned service where critical business and state functions can operate while much of the public is severed from the global web; around mid-January, state media published a list of sites available on the NIN (such as domestic search, maps, video, and messaging). The broader trajectory described is toward an “endgame” of pervasive monitoring: integrated CCTV, facial recognition, message-capture apps, and profiling systems aimed at “lifestyle surveillance,” coupled with an isolationist network design that can block inbound and outbound connections. Analysts caution that external signals cannot yet confirm whether the volatility is intentional or system failure, but warn the episode could accelerate permanent disconnection or splintering from the global internet, while also noting a practical limit: total disconnection can backfire by pushing more people into the streets when they cannot learn what is happening from home. (Key numbers: 1)