战事已显示供水系统的脆弱性。伊朗已攻击阿联富查伊拉（Fujairah）一座为全球最大级淡化厂之一供电的电站；科威特亦因拦截无人机后残骸坠落，引发一座水厂火灾。沙国朱拜勒（Jubail）淡化厂风险尤其关键：它透过约500公里（原文500-kilometer）管线向利雅德提供逾90%饮用水。美国驻沙大使馆2008年备忘录警告，若该厂、管线或相关电力设施遭重创，利雅德可能一周内必须撤离。
虽然各国后续强化备援，但多数淡化设施仍在伊朗飞弹射程内，形成高风险不对称压力点。作者认为，伊朗难以在正规军事层面升级对抗美以联合力量，因而采取「固守消耗」与打击能源、机场、供水等软目标并行策略。直接打击水厂将被视为重大升级，但误击或蓄意攻击皆具现实可能；1991年Saddam Hussein部队蓄意向波斯湾排油、意图干扰登陆并损害沙国淡化能力的先例，凸显此风险。结论是：石油重要，但水不可替代。
The commentary argues that in an escalating US-Iran war, the Middle East’s most critical strategic commodity is not oil but drinking water. Gulf states hold hydrocarbon wealth worth trillions of dollars, yet remain structurally water-scarce, so since the 1970s they have used energy income to build desalination systems; today the region depends on nearly 450 plants. About 100 million people live across the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, with Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE almost fully dependent on desalinated water, and Saudi Arabia, including Riyadh, also heavily reliant.
Current hostilities already show how fragile that system is. Iran has struck a power station in Fujairah, UAE, that supports one of the world’s largest desalination plants, and drone-interception debris in Kuwait caused a fire at a plant. Risk is most concentrated at Saudi Arabia’s Jubail complex: via an approximately 500 km pipeline network (original: 500-kilometer), it supplies more than 90% of Riyadh’s drinking water. A 2008 US embassy memo warned that if the plant, pipelines, or linked power infrastructure were seriously damaged, Riyadh might need evacuation within a week.
Although Gulf governments have added redundancy, most plants remain within Iranian missile range, creating a high-impact asymmetric pressure point. The author’s strategic reading is that Iran cannot out-escalate combined US-Israeli military power conventionally, so it is mixing endurance with attacks on soft targets such as energy sites, airports, and water infrastructure. A deliberate strike on desalination would be a major escalation, but accidental or intentional disruption remains plausible; the 1991 case in which Saddam Hussein’s forces released oil into the Gulf partly to harm nearby Saudi desalination capacity shows the precedent. Bottom line: oil is vital, but water is irreplaceable.