美国最高法院以 6-3 的裁决，否决了 Donald Trump 援引 1977 年《International Emergency Economic Powers Act》来实施广泛「对等」关税的做法，其中包括「Liberation Day」措施，以及针对 Canada、Mexico、China 的与 fentanyl 相关关税。这项裁决被视为重大的法律与政治挫败，因为 Trump 绕过了国会，并征收最高达 70% 的关税。此案也发生在行政部门扩张紧急权力使用的背景下：据报导，Trump 在第二任期前 9 个月内宣布了 9 次国家紧急状态，这一速度被形容为自《National Emergencies Act》于 50 年前生效以来，超过任何一位总统。
法院裁决在贸易与诉讼层面立即造成政策与行政上的扰动。它使与 China、European Union 及许多其他已受美国关税措施影响的伙伴之关系更加复杂，同时也未解决企业是否能拿回已缴关税退款的问题。超过 1,000 家公司已提起诉讼，要求追回约 $170 billion 已支付关税中的部分金额，而大法官将退款问题留给下级法院处理。财政压力是核心：Trump 先前称大规模退款可能是「catastrophe」与「economic disaster」，因为原本预期关税收入可协助为其 One Big Beautiful Bill Act 下的减税与支出承诺提供资金。
民意与模型化的宏观影响显示，政治与经济后果可能好坏并存。11 月的 ABC News/Washington Post 民调发现，近 2/3 的美国人不赞成 Trump 的关税政策，其中包括 96% 的 Democrats、72% 的 independents、以及 29% 的 Republicans。Bloomberg Economics 估计，若 Trump 在相关案件中遭遇全面性失利，美国平均有效关税率可能从 14.5% 降至 6.5%，若成本传导发生，可能缓解消费者价格压力。关键但书是策略上的持续性：Trump 已示意有备援方案，仍可动用替代法源，尤其是 1962 年《Trade Expansion Act》与 1974 年《Trade Act》；这些法规在其第一任期曾被使用，且可能再度用于 autos、semiconductors、pharmaceuticals 等产业。
The US Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck down Donald Trump’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose broad “reciprocal” tariffs, including “Liberation Day” measures and fentanyl-linked duties on Canada, Mexico, and China. The ruling is framed as a major legal and political setback because Trump had bypassed Congress and imposed levies that reached up to 70%. It also lands in the context of expansive executive emergency use: Trump reportedly declared 9 national emergencies in his first 9 months of his second term, a pace described as exceeding any president since the National Emergencies Act was enacted 50 years ago.
The court’s ruling creates immediate policy and administrative disruption across trade and litigation fronts. It complicates relations with China, the European Union, and many other partners already subject to US tariff actions, while leaving unresolved whether companies will receive refunds for duties already collected. More than 1,000 companies have sued to recover portions of roughly $170 billion in paid tariffs, and the justices left that refund question to lower courts. Fiscal pressure is central: Trump previously called large-scale refunds a potential “catastrophe” and “economic disaster,” because tariff revenue had been expected to help finance tax cuts and spending commitments under his One Big Beautiful Bill Act.
Public opinion and modeled macro effects suggest mixed political-economic consequences. A November ABC News/Washington Post poll found nearly 2/3 of Americans disapproved of Trump’s tariff policy, including 96% of Democrats, 72% of independents, and 29% of Republicans. Bloomberg Economics estimated that a sweeping loss for Trump could lower the US average effective tariff rate from 14.5% to 6.5%, potentially easing consumer prices if pass-through occurs. The key caveat is strategic persistence: Trump signaled a backup plan and can still use alternative statutes, notably the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974, which were used in his first term and could be redeployed for sectors such as autos, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals.